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South-South Trade and Investment: The 
Good, The Bad and The Ugly—African 
Perspectives 
Uché U. Ewelukwa* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The last decade witnessed two unprecedented and 
significant developments in the global economic landscape—the 
emergence of new major global players among developing 
countries1 and the development of sound, robust, deepening 
and widening economic activity between developing countries.2 
The South’s share in global trade is growing steadily and the 
South now accounts for an increasing share of global demand.3 
 
* LL.B., Dipl., LL.M., LL.M., S.J.D.; Professor, University of Arkansas School 
of Law. Professor Uché Ewelukwa Ofodile is a professor at the University of 
Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. She teaches in the areas of intellectual 
property law, international trade law, international business transactions, and 
international human rights law. She has been a visiting professor at the 
University of Oklahoma Law Center (Crowe and Dunlevy International 
Visiting Professor of Law), DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, and 
the American University of Armenia in Yerevan, Armenia. Professor 
Ewelukwa has received numerous awards and fellowships for her work. For 
example, she is a recipient of the Global Justice Fellowship award from the 
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (CCEIA). Professor 
Ewelukwa is a frequent speaker at national and international conferences on 
trade and intellectual property law. In February 2011, she addressed a group 
of United Nations diplomats delivering a lecture as part of a two-day 
workshop in intellectual property for diplomats accredited to the United 
Nations at the UN headquarters in New York. Professor Ewelukwa graduated 
in the top 1 percent of her class with a Bachelor of Laws degree (LL.B.) from 
the University of Nigeria. She also holds a Master of Laws degree (LL.M.) in 
international business law from the University College London, another LL.M. 
degree in international law from Harvard Law School, and a Doctor of 
Juridical Science (S.J.D.) degree from Harvard University. 
 1. See generally Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming 
with BRICs: The Path to 2050, GLOBAL ECON. PAPER NO: 99 (Goldman Sachs, 
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1, 2003 [hereinafter Goldman Sachs No: 99]. 
 2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Accra, Ghana, 
Apr. 20–25, 2008, Accra Accord, para. 7, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//tdxii_accra_accord_en.pdf [hereinafter Accra 
Accord].  
 3. In this paper the term “North-South” refers to the socioeconomic 
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Developing countries are now trading with one another more 
than at any other time in history. On the investment front, 
developing countries are reshaping the world’s investment 
architecture with the phenomenal increase in the depth of 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by these countries into 
other developing countries. Increasingly, developing countries 
see South-South economic cooperation as “[a] key element in 
the strategy of collective self-reliance” and “an essential process 
of global economic development.”4 Experts attribute Asia’s 
resilience in the face of the global financial crisis, in part, to the 
growing significance of south-south trade for the region.5 
Today, more than 40% of South Korea’s exports reportedly go to 
the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.6 
Hanjin Shipping of South Korea, one of Asia’s biggest shipping 
companies, is reportedly threatening the dominant position of 
Maersk Line of Denmark and CMA CGM of France in West 
Africa and is also poised to conquer South America, a region 
presently dominated by European container lines.7 The 
company’s chief executive, Kim Young Min, is reported as 
saying that a terminal the company opened in Algeciras on the 
Gibraltar Strait in southern Spain in July 2010 will be a 
“beachhead” for an assault on markets in West Africa and 
South America.  
The concept of a new geography of trade and investment is 
generating much discussion today.8 By some accounts the 
centre-periphery relationship between the North and the 
 
division between advanced and wealthy developed countries collectively 
referred to as “the North” and the less developed, poorer countries collectively 
referred to as “the South.” 
 4. Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preference 
among Developing Countries, in letter dated Oct. 11, 1982 from the 
Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/37/544, Annex II (Oct. 14, 1982). 
 5. David Pilling, Asia: More Self Contained, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/172359aa-a4b4-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html. 
 6. Id. The term BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim 
O’Neill around 2001 and is used to refer to the four rapidly rising economies of 
the world: Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  
 7. Hanjin Prepares Container Shipping Assault, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b1eb180-9285-11df-9142-00144feab49a.html. 
 8. On the geography of trade literature, including the Core-Periphery 
model, see generally ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Richard 
Baldwin et al. eds, 2003); MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: 
CITIES, REGIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999); PAUL KRUGMAN, 
GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991); DAVID LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF 
NATIONS (1998).  
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South, a hallmark of the old geography of trade, is nearing an 
end if not already completely over. The eleventh United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD XI) 
opened in June 2004 with an inaugural ceremony and a special 
session on “The New Trade Geography: The Role of South-
South Trade and Cooperation” at which the President of Brazil, 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and former Secretary General of the 
United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, both talked about a “new 
trade geography” in which South-South trade would play a 
growing role.9 Increasingly, South-South economic cooperation 
is no longer seen as friendship of the marginalized but as an 
inevitable consequence of a steady but gradual shift in power 
away from the United States and Europe. It is also a shift away 
from a trade geography that was largely shaped by 
colonialism10 and defined by asymmetric patterns. Although 
South-South economic cooperation remains primarily intra-
regional, inter-regional trade and investment is on the rise as 
well.  
South-South cooperation has received the blessing of the 
UN and the support of the most dominant developing 
economies.11 December 19th is now recognized as the UN Day 
for South-South Cooperation.12 Within the framework of the 
Group of 77 (G-77), China, Brazil and India, as well as 
countries in Africa have all endorsed and embraced South-
South economic cooperation as a necessary and inevitable 
development strategy. Proponents believe that South-South 
cooperation “can contribute substantially to supporting 
national development agendas and fostering economic growth 
and efficiency, including providing new trading opportunities 
 
 9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 13–18, 
2004, New Geography of International Trade: South-South Cooperation in an 
Increasingly Interdependent World, U.N. Doc. TD/404, (June 4, 2004) 
[hereinafter New Geography of International Trade]. 
 10. Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Turn to South-South Trade, 
REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5170BC2009020
8. 
 11. See Position Paper of the People's Republic of China At the 65th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 13, 2010, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjsxw/t751986.htm. 
 12. By resolution 58/220 of December 23, 2003, the General Assembly 
decided to declare December 19th United Nations Day for South-South 
Cooperation. On that same day, the General Assembly endorsed the Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation 
Among Developing Countries. G.A. Res. 58/220, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/220 (Dec. 
23, 2003). 
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and generating benefits of economies of scale for participating 
countries, and is particularly important for countries of small 
economic size.”13 Asha-Rose Migiro, deputy secretary-general of 
the UN, forecasts that “[f]uture historians may well see the rise 
of South-South co-operation as one of the key developments of 
the early 21st century. Given its vast potential to support the 
rise of billions of people from poverty and achieve the 
[millennium development goals], it is a change that offers us 
great hope.”14 According to the Accra Accord, the main 
document guiding UNCTAD´s work that was adopted in 2004 
at the UNCTAD XII quadrennial conference, “the new 
geography of the global economy has the potential to broaden 
the spectrum of multilateral cooperation and to promote the 
integration of all developing countries in the long term.”15 
Africa has not been left out of the South-South train. 
Turkey’s “Opening up to Africa Policy” was adopted in 1998 and 
is designed to enhance cooperation between Turkey and 
Africa.16 Turkey declared 2005 the “Year of Africa” and the first 
Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit convened in Istanbul in 
August 2008.17 Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) provides the platform for Sino-Africa 
cooperation on a broad range of areas.18 In 2005, president Rho 
Moo-hyun of South Korea launched the “Korea’s Initiative for 
African development.” The first Korea-Africa Forum was 
convened in November 2006. The India-Africa Forum Summit, 
the official platform for the African-Indian relations, convened 
in New Delhi on April 8–9, 2008.19 The IBSA Trilateral 
 
 13. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 13. 
 14. Asha-Rose Migiro, A New Spirit of Solidarity Rises in the South, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d59ea7c-e463-11de-a0ea-
00144feab49a.html. 
 15. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 7. 
 16. See generally Serif Bahcecik, Turkey's "Opening up to Africa": A 
Passing Fad or A Long-Term Strategy? (Apr. 2, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p360842_index.html. See also, 
Mehmet Özkan, Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects, 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=mehmetoz
kan. 
 17. Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, Istanbul, Turkey, Aug. 18–21, 
2008, http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/the-summit.en.mfa. 
 18. See FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, www.focac.org/eng/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 19. The Summit brought together the heads of state and governments of 
India and fourteen African countries chosen by the African Union. 
Participants discussed future cooperation in a broad range of areas, including 
trade, science and technology, and the environment. 
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Cooperation20 as well as the recently concluded cooperation 
framework agreement between the South African Development 
Community (SADC) and the Government of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil21 also speaks to the growing linkage between 
Africa and other developing countries. There are speculations 
now whether South Africa will join the BRIC countries to 
create a new truly global grouping that may be called BRICSA 
or SABRIC.22 Altogether, the years of 2000-10 saw the laying of 
the foundation-stones of what promises to be strategic 
relationships between Africa and a host of developing 
countries. While it may be too early to assess the long term 
development implications of these new relationships, an 
examination of their emerging foundations is important and 
warranted. Although Africa is on board the South-South train, 
one might wonder just how close to the center of the emerging 
trade and investment geography the continent really is. The 
development and the legal and institutional implications of this 
new geography for countries in the continent, particularly the 
least developed countries (LDCs), is not yet fully known or 
explored.23 This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. To 
the extent that trade and FDI together with sound governance, 
development aid, and effective global and national policies can 
be transformative, growing Africa-South economic cooperation 
has development implications for many countries in Africa and 
must be constantly scrutinized.  
This paper examines, from an African viewpoint, the 
benefits as well as challenges of South-South cooperation. 
Answers will be sought to several questions including: 
1. Is South-South economic cooperation good for Africa and 
should African governments scale up efforts to seize the 
opportunity presented by this revival of South-South 
cooperation? 
2. Does South-South cooperation offer real opportunities for 
 
 20. IBSA TRILATERAL OFFICIAL WEBSITE, www.ibsa-trilateral.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 21. Press Release, Southern African Development Community, Press 
Release on the Signing of Agreements in Brazil, http://www.sadc.int/index/bro
wse/page/729 (last visited March 5, 2011). 
 22. South Africa Wants to Join BRICs Club, THE MARKET ORACLE (Aug 
28, 2010), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article22265.html.  
 23. Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, UN OFF. HIGH REP. FOR 
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES & 
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ 
(last visited March 5, 2011). 
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countries in Africa to reduce poverty, grow their 
economies, and integrate into the global economy?  
3. Does South-South trade and investment provide 
opportunity for Africa’s structural transformation? Is 
Africa-South trade replicating the unhealthy pattern of 
trade between Africa and the North, which has Africa 
locked in as exporter of commodities and importer of 
manufactured goods? 
4. How might African governments proactively exploit and 
maximize the benefits of South-South trade and 
investment while minimizing the attendant risks, 
dangers, and challenges? 
5. Will South-South trade contribute to a more balanced 
and equitable process of global economic governance 
and development? 
The paper focuses on South-South trade and investment 
cooperation and does not delve too deeply into cooperation on a 
host of other areas. The paper focuses primarily on bilateral 
cooperation arrangements between Africa and other developing 
countries. The reason is obvious. Of the three main types of 
cooperation arrangements between Africa and other Southern 
partners—bilateral, trilateral and regional level cooperation—
the bilateral arrangements are the most developed.24 This 
paper will focus particularly on China-Africa trade and 
investment relations. The reason for focusing on Sino-African 
relations is also obvious. Compared to other Africa-South 
arrangements, China-Africa relations are the most advanced in 
terms of the volume of trade and investment involved, the level 
and quality of cooperation on a broad range of subjects, and the 
quality of the implementing mechanisms.25 As of 2008, two-way 
trade between China and Africa exceeded US$100 billion. The 
past decade has also seen Beijing substantially increase 
development assistance to Africa, deliver on debt cancellation 
 
 24. Bilateral partnerships describe relationships between Africa and a 
single developing country, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or 
the Turkey-Africa Cooperation. A trilateral arrangement stems from 
cooperation involving a country in Africa and two other developing country 
partners, e.g., the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA). Interregional 
arrangements describe arrangement between Africa as a block and other 
regions, such as the Afro-Arab Cooperation or the Africa-South America 
Strategic Partnership. 
 25. Uche Ewelukwa, Trade, Empires and Subjects: China-Africa Trade: A 
New Fair Trade Arrangement or The Third Scramble For Africa?, 41(2) VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505 (2008). 
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commitments, and open the Chinese market further to products 
from Africa.  
The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 provides 
an overview of the history, evolution and trends in South-South 
economic cooperation generally. Section 3 examines the 
participation of Africa in South-South trade and attempts to 
explain trends in Africa-South economic relations in the past 
three decades. Section 4 focuses particularly on Sino-Africa 
trade and identifies past and present trends in the unfolding 
arrangement. The good, the bad and the ugly aspects of Africa-
South arrangements are evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 offers 
suggestions and ideas on how to move the Africa-South 
dialogue forward taking into account Africa’s long term 
strategic interests. The paper concludes in Section 7.  
II. ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND TRENDS IN SOUTH-SOUTH 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT  
A new geography of trade is clearly emerging. Under the 
old trade geography, countries in the global South served 
primarily as sources for natural resources and markets for 
finished goods manufactured in the North. The 
Center/Periphery trade pattern was reinforced and sharpened 
by decades of colonial rule and informed the structuring of the 
global economic apparatus. However, the last two decades have 
witnessed changes in the landscape of global trade, finance, 
and investment that point to a restructuring of the old patterns 
of trade. In the last two decades, the South’s share of the world 
trade has grown (30% in 2004 up from 20% in the mid-1980s), 
the share of manufactures in the export of developing countries 
has grown (from 20% in 1980 to almost 70% in 2000), and the 
frequency of transnational cooperation from emerging 
developing countries has increased as well. Some developing 
countries are becoming active players in certain dynamic 
sectors of global trade hitherto reserved for the North. 
Developing countries are buying more than ever before from 
each other, and the income gap between developed countries 
and some developing countries has narrowed considerably. 
Furthermore, South-South trade is growing at a much faster 
rate than North-South trade or global trade and has potential 
to grow further. It is speculated that an additional US$15.5 
billion in trade would be generated if developing countries 
agree to reduce the average tariff applied to each other by 
EWELUKWA - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:17 PM 
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50%.26  
Although the North remains the main architect of the 
global economic landscape and the main driver of international 
economic relations, judged by factors such as income levels, 
share in world trade, pattern of specialization, institutional 
considerations, and the size of economic operators, a slow and 
quiet transformation is arguably underway.27 South-South 
economic cooperation is a not a new phenomenon. What is new 
is: 
 a move beyond regional and sub-regional boundaries to 
inter-regional cooperation; 
 greater visibility given to South-South issues in the 
programming of global institutions; 
 greater rationalization of actions such as better 
coordination and harmonization of positions and effort 
to establish formal mechanisms for cooperation and 
interaction; 
 a new emphasis on cooperation within a broader range of 
areas including trade, investment, finance, energy, and 
health;28  
 a new emphasis on strengthening and widening existing 
bridges connecting countries; 
 greater recognition of South-South cooperation as a 
viable tool for economic growth and development; 
 a new focus on South-South triangular cooperation; 
 a shift away from efforts to fundamentally restructure 
international economic relations and create a New 
International Economic Order towards efforts aimed at 
successful integration into the global economic system; 
and 
 
 26. Statement by His Excellency Sheik Mohamed bin Ahmad bin Jassim 
Al-Thandi, Minister of Economy and Commerce of the State of Qatar, HIGH-
LEVEL FORUM ON TRADE & INVESTMENT (Dec. 4, 2004) 
http://www.g77.org/doha/qatar_minister.htm. 
 27. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 10 (“The 
primacy of the North in international economic relations, however, will 
remain. It will continue to decisively influence developments in the world 
economy and trade. The asymmetries between the economies of developing 
and developed countries are just too stark, and a meaningful convergence 
between the two will need a very long period of time.”). 
 28. See Marrakech Declaration on South-South Cooperation, para. 2, 
Marrakech, Morocco, Dec. 16–19, 2003, 
http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Declaration.htm [hereinafter 
Marrakech Declaration]. 
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 a shift away from an overtly anti-Western rhetoric 
towards an emphasis on collective self-reliance.29 
This section offers an overview of the history, evolution, 
and trends in South-South trade and investment cooperation.  
A. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE  
South-South economic cooperation can be traced to the 
Asian-Africa Conference (Bandung Conference) held in 
Indonesia in 1955, the Cairo Conference on the Problems of 
Economic Development in 1962, the first session of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, and 
the Final Act adopted in 1964 following the conference. The 
three conferences eventually culminated in the creation of the 
Group of Seventy Seven (G-77)30 and UNCTAD in 1964. The 
first ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 in October 1967 
concluded with the adoption of the Charter of Algiers, which 
laid out the challenges confronting developing countries in 
global trade and noted that expansion of economic cooperation 
among developing countries was “an important element of a 
global strategy for development.”31 Since 1964, successive 
declarations of the Group of 77 have emphasized South-South 
cooperation, including the Caracas Declaration of 1989, the 
Cairo Declaration of 1986, and the San Jose Declaration of 
1997. By 2003, developing countries saw South-South 
cooperation no longer as merely a desirable goal to pursue but 
as “an imperative to complement North-South cooperation in 
order to contribute to the achievement of the internationally 
agreed development goals including the millennium 
development goals.” 32 South-South cooperation gained new 
momentum following the Asian-African Sub-regional 
 
 29. See generally G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (May 1, 
1974) (proclaiming the establishment of the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO)); G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3202 (May 1, 1974) 
(discussing the Programme of Action on the NIEO); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) (discussing the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States); G.A. Res. 3362, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3362 (Sept. 16, 1975) 
(discussing Development and International Economic Order). 
 30. The Group of 77 (G-77) was established on June 15, 1964 with the 
adoption of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” by seventy-
seven developing countries at the end of the first session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. See THE GROUP 
OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/doc/.  
 31. First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, Algiers, Alg., Oct. 10–25, 
1967, Charter of Algiers, available at http://www.g77.org/doc/algier%7E1.htm.  
 32. Marrakech Declaration, supra note 28, para. 1. 
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Organization Conference (AASROC) in Bandung, Indonesia, 
from 29-30 July 2003, UNCTAD XI in Sao Paulo in 2004,33 
UNTAD XII in Ghana in 2008,34 and the UN Conference on 
South-South cooperation in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2009. 
During a High-level segment on “New Geography of 
International Trade” at UNCTAD XI, several heads of state 
and government concluded that: (a) the centuries-old trade 
geography is changing with the South moving steadily away 
from the periphery of world economy and trade; (b) developing 
countries could provide a steady boost to the growth of 
international trade and expansion of the world economy; (c) 
given the primacy of the North in international economic 
relations, South-South trade cannot and must not be seen as a 
substitute for North-South trade; and (d) South-South trade 
offers opportunities to developing countries to increase their 
profile in international trade.  
In conclusion, since 1964, developing countries, within the 
framework of the G-77, have adopted programs directed at 
implementing the vision of South-South economic 
cooperation.35 They have also implemented several initiatives 
directed at broadening and intensifying cooperation including: 
(i) the establishment of UNCTAD;36 (ii) the launch of the Global 
System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries 
(GSTP);37 (iii) the establishment of the Perez-Guerrero Trust 
 
 33. See Eleventh Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, São Paulo, Braz., June 13–18, 2004, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Meeting.asp?intItemID=4301&lang=1. 
 34. See Twelfth Session United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Accra, Ghana, April 20–25, 2008, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/meeting.asp?intItemID=4287&lang=1&m=1
3044&info=highlights. 
 35. These programs include: (i) Program of Work of the Mexico City 
Conference on ECDC of May 1976; (ii) the Manila Plan of Action of February 
1976; (iii) the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978 (BAPOA); (iv) the Arusha 
Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations of 
February 1979; (v) the Caracas Programme of Action on Economic Co-
operation among Developing countries (1981); (vi) the Bali Plan of Action 
(1998); (vii) the San Plan of Action (1997); (viii) the Marrakech Framework of 
Implementation of South-South Cooperation (2003); and (ix) the Doha Plan of 
Action (2005). 
 36. See Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries 
Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, June 15, 1964, available at 
http://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html. 
 37. See, e.g., Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing Countries, supra note 4; Ministerial Meeting 
on Global Systems of Trade Preferences, New Delhi, India, July 1985, 
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Fund for Economic and Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (PGTF),38 and the launch of a 
Consortium on Science, Technology and Innovation for the 
South.39  
B. TRENDS IN SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
The growing importance of the South in the global market 
as well as the new dynamism and momentum in South-South 
trade underscore developments in the last two decades that 
have fueled speculations about the emergence of a new 
geography of trade and investment. Two decades ago South-
South trade was considered the “weakest segment of world 
trade.”40 Today, as producers, traders, and consumers, the 
South is becoming important players in the global market 
prompting the conclusion, in some quarters, that “the South 
represents a future engine of growth and dynamism for the 
global economy.” According to UNCTAD: 
 The South’s enjoys a 30% share in global trade (up from 
20% in mid-1980s; 
 Growing interdependence between the South and North 
is at a level never seen before;41 
 Over the past 15 years, annual FDI outflow from 
developing countries have grown faster than FDI 
 
Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preferences, 
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/Declarations/1985NewDelhi_E.pdf; 
Brasilia Declaration on the Launching of the First Round of Negotiations 
Within the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries 
(1986); Tehran Declaration on the Launching of the Second Round of 
Negotiations Within the GSTP (1992); São Paulo Declaration on the 
Launching of the Third Round of Negotiations Within the Global System of 
Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries (2004).  
 38. See About the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF), THE GROUP OF 77 
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org/pgtf/. 
 39. The Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 and China endorsed the 
creation of a Consortium on Science, Technology and Innovation for the South 
(COSTIS) at the minister's annual meeting in New York City on Sept. 22, 
2006. 
 40. See VIVIANNE VENTURA-DIAS, SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE: TRENDS TRADES 
AND OBSTACLES TO ITS GROWTH (1989); see also David Greenaway & Chris 
Milner, South-South Trade: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 5(1) THE WORLD 
BANK RES. OBSERVER 47 (1990), http://ideas.repec.org/s/oup/wbrobs.html. 
 41. UNCTAD Secretariat, Doha High-Level Forum on Trade and 
Investment, Doha, Qatar, Dec. 5–6, 2004, The New Geography of International 
Economic Relations, Background Paper No. 1, available at 
http://www.g77.org/doha/Doha-BP01-New_Geography_of_International_Econo
mic_Relations.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Background Paper 2004]. 
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outflow from developed countries. 
 Developing countries are becoming important and 
significant sources of foreign capital in other 
developing countries. 
 In 2003, developing countries accounted for 6% of the 
world’s FDI flows and 10% of the world stock.  
 The value of total export of developing economies in 
merchandise trade rose from US$4,212.4 in 2000 to 
US$6,292.3 in 2005 and US$8,096.9 in 2007. 
 Rise in the percentage share of South-South trade in 
export of developing countries in merchandise trade 
rose from 17.2% in 2005 to 24.0% in 2005 and 27.5% in 
2007.  
The growing dynamism in South-South trade in 
commodities, manufactures, and services is also a remarkable 
development of the last two decades. According to available 
data: 
 More than 40% of export from developing countries go to 
other developing countries; 
 South-South trade is becoming important in the trade 
and development strategies of developing countries;  
 Increasing at an annual rate of 11%, South-South trade 
is growing faster than North-South trade or global 
trade; 
 South-South service trade, FDI, and technology transfer 
is also on the rise; 
 The number of South-South international investment 
agreements, including bilateral investment treaties 
and double taxation treaties, has significantly 
increased; in 2003, 28% of all BITs were those 
concluded between developing countries (up from 10% 
in 1989); 
 The value of the exports of developing countries in 
merchandise trade to other developing countries stood 
at US$724.0 billion in 2000, US$1,511.0 billion in 2005, 
and US$2,230.3 billion in 2007; and  
 The percentage share of South-South trade in total world 
export of merchandise rose from 11.5% in 2000 to 
14.8% in 2005 and 16.4% in 2007. 
In conclusion, the last two decades has witnessed a 
deepening, widening, and intensification of cooperation among 
developing countries in the economic sphere. Developing 
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countries are not only trading more with which each other, but 
are also investing in each others’ markets. Pointing to growth 
in South-South cooperation is a substantial increase in the 
number of international investment agreements—bilateral 
investment treaties, double taxation treaties, and preferential 
trade agreements with investment components—among 
developing countries. Since 1964, when the first South-South 
BIT was signed, the number of such agreements has grown. 
According to UNCTAD, South-South BITs account for 25% of 
all the BITs and BITs involving developing countries and 
transition economies account for an additional 10% of all 
BITs.42 In other words, emerging and developing economies are 
not only attracting more investment, but are also becoming big 
investors and are investing in other developing countries.  
C. IMPETUS FOR SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
Several factors explain the growth and renewed interest in 
South-South trade in the last two decades.43 These include: (i) 
market access barriers and other market entry problems (e.g. 
costs) in developed countries;44 (ii) the global recession and 
attendant contraction in demand in developed countries; (iii) 
the perceived need to explore new complementarities now 
arising in South-South trade;45 (iv) developing countries’ desire 
to reduce their exposure to movements in demands in 
developed countries; (v) the desire of a growing number of 
developing countries to collaborate in meeting the challenges of 
globalization, trade liberalization, and multilateralism; (vi) the 
emergence of new multinationals from emerging economies; 
 
 42. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS, 5, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.26 (2005). 
 43. Several push and pull factors account for the changes in the South-
South trade. Among the push factors are: increased competition in domestic 
markets, need for raw materials, increased market access opportunities, and 
labor costs. Ethnic and cultural ties, as well as geographic ties, are also cited 
as examples of push factors. See UNCTAD Background Paper 2004, supra note 
41. 
 44. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, São Paulo, 
Braz., June 13–18, 2004, Regionalism and South-South Cooperation: The case 
of Mercosur and India, at 13, U.N. Doc. TD(XI)/BP/11 (June 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Case of Mercosur and India]. 
 45. See Chairman of the Group of 77, Letter dated June 5, 1981 from the 
Representative of Venezuela for Economic Affairs to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, A/36/333 (June 26, 1981) [hereinafter 
Caracas Programme of Action 1981].  
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(vii) saturation of demand in developed countries and the need 
to search out new markets. The growth in South-South trade is 
also tied to purposeful and strategic policies and actions by 
emerging developing country economies and their firms, income 
growth in some developing countries, heightened mobility of 
factors of production and business, changes in demand 
patterns, and demographic changes in the North as well as the 
South.46  
To proponents, South-South trade offers developing 
countries immense opportunity for growth and sustainable 
development. First, South-South trade offers much opportunity 
for efficiency gains and specialization.47 Second, experts believe 
that “the potential benefit from freer South-South trade 
may . . . be at least as large as the gains that developing 
countries can obtain from better access to rich countries’ 
markets.”48 Third, given the room for even greater expansion in 
the future, South-South trade could yield significant gains for 
some countries; presently, exports from one developing country 
to another account for a mere 6% of the total world 
merchandise trade and South-South trade in services account 
for a mere 10% of the world merchandise trade.49 Fourth, LDCs 
neglected in the globalization process arguably stand a better 
chance in South-South arrangements. Fifth, saturation and 
shift in demand in Northern market makes it imperative for 
many developing countries to search for new markets. Sixth, 
South-South trade provides opportunity for countries to break 
their dependence on Northern markets and/or cushion 
themselves from the changes in those markets. Seventh, it is 
also believed that South-South trade provides opportunities for 
spillovers in knowledge and technology and opportunities for 
developing countries to share experiences and strategies.50 
Eighth, at the height of the global financial crisis, South-South 
trade provided the only bright spot in terms of growth. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, many developing countries now see the 
wisdom in turning to their neighbors to bolster trade and 
compensate for slumping demand in rich countries and falling 
 
 46. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 8. 
 47. See Case of Mercoser and India, supra note 44. 
 48. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
South-South Trade: Vital for Development, POLICY BRIEF, August 2006, at 1, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/50/37400725.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Case of Mercoser and India, supra note 44. 
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commodity prices.51 Overall, developing countries increasingly 
see South-South economic cooperation as “a dynamic element 
in their development,”52 and “an important contribution to 
collective action aimed at equitable restructuring of 
international economic relation.”53 
D. ENDORSEMENT OF SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE 
South-South cooperation has received the support of the 
most dominant developing economies including China,54 Brazil, 
and India. South-South cooperation has long received the 
blessing of the UN as reflected in numerous instruments, 
including the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and 
Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing 
Countries, General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/119 of 
December 20, 1995,55 Resolution 33/134 of December 19, 1978, 
Resolution 49/96 of December 19, 1994, and ECOSOC 
Resolution 1992/41 of June 30, 1992. Encouragement has also 
come from the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, held in Monterrey in March 2002,56 and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in 
Johannesburg in August 2002.57 UN support is also seen in the 
establishment of the UNDP Special Unit for South-South 
Cooperation58 and the UN General Assembly’s High-Level 
Committee on South-South Cooperation. 
 
 51. Lynn, supra note 10. 
 52. See Ministerial Meeting on Global System of Trade Preferences, supra 
note 37. 
 53. See Belgrade Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preferences 
among Developing Countries (1988), pmbl., para 2, 
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/Declarations/1988Belgrade_E.pdf. 
 54. See Position Paper of the People's Republic of China At the 65th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 11. 
 55. G.A. Res. 50/119, U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/119 (December 20, 1995), 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r119.htm. 
 56. Updated information on the follow-up to the International Conference 
on Financing for Development can be found at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd 
(encouraging South-South cooperation and urging the strengthening of South-
South cooperation in the delivery of assistance). 
 57. The text of the report of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development and information about follow-up action can be found at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html.  
 58. Who We Are, SPECIAL UNIT FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, 
http://ssc.undp.org/?id=177. 
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E. THE PROMISE OF WIN-WIN, MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL 
OUTCOMES 
Embedded in the South-South cooperation discourse is the 
promise that unfolding arrangements will be based on 
mutuality of interest and yield beneficial results for all. 
According to the Caracas Programme of Action of 1981, “[a]ll 
developing countries should be in a position to benefit equitably 
from a practical evidence of solidarity.” According to the 
Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade 
Preferences Among Developing Countries, the GSTP “should be 
based on the principles of mutuality of advantages in such a 
way as to benefit equitably all participants, taking into account 
their respective levels of economic and industrial development, 
the patterns of their external trade policies and systems.”59 In 
the Ministerial Declaration of 2009, G-77 Member States 
stressed that South-South “is a development agenda . . . based 
on a strong, genuine, broad-based partnership and 
solidarity . . . complete equality, mutual respect and mutual 
benefit . . . [and] respects national sovereignty in the context of 
shared responsibility.”60  
Also embedded in the South’s critique of the dominant 
global economic system is a promise that the South-South 
arrangement will be different from the North-South 
arrangement and will yield more development-dividends. Over 
the years, G77 members have expressed concern about: 
 the imbalance and asymmetry of the multilateral trading 
system;61 
 worsening terms of trade for developing countries;62  
 the rising tide of protectionism in the developed 
countries;63 
 stalemate in the North-South negotiations;64 
 the problem of trade gap in developing countries;  
 
 59. Ministerial Declaration on the Global System of Trade Preferences 
among Developing Countries, supra note 4, at 3. 
 60. Ministerial Declaration adopted by the 33rd Annual Meeting of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77, New York, U.S., Sept. 25, 
2009, http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2009.htm [hereinafter 33rd Annual 
Meeting of Ministers]. 
 61. See Ministerial Meeting on Global System of Trade Preferences, supra 
note 37, para. 2. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
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 the possibility of compensatory financing to meet long-
term deterioration in the terms of trade; 
 the volatility of commodity markets;65 and  
 the dismantling of protectionist barriers to the markets 
of developed countries.66 
In conclusion, the twenty-first century is witnessing 
increasing cooperation among developing countries and 
renewed efforts to encourage, stimulate, and support South-
South cooperation. Although still focused on addressing old 
issues, over the years new issues such as sustainable 
development, social development and equity and inclusion, the 
increased frequency of financial crises, trade subsidies, and the 
role of information and communication technologies have 
appeared on the South-South agenda.  
III. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT: TRENDS, 
MODALITIES, AND MECHANISMS 
Africa shares the broad goals of South-South cooperation 
including the goals of fuller integration into the world 
economy,67 influencing the structure, agenda, and architecture 
of international economic relations.68 Joint negotiating 
positions on major issues of the multilateral trade 
negotiations69 are also shared by countries in Africa. Africa’s 
economic indicators sheds light on why South-South trade 
holds much attraction for policy-makers in the continent: 
 the continent’s share of global merchandise trade is low 
and stands at around 3%;  
 the continent’s share of global FDI flow is also extremely 
low and stands at about 5%; 
 the composition of Africa’s export is troubling, exhibiting 
unhealthy reliance on primary products and showing 
very little manufacturing of value-added products; 
 
 65. Ministerial Declaration on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of 
the Group of 77, São Paulo, Braz., June 13–18, 2004, U.N. Doc. TD/405 (June 
12, 2004).  
 66. Id.  
 67. Marrakech Declaration, supra note 28, at para. 13. 
 68. 33rd Annual Meeting of Ministers, supra note 60, para. 70 (“South-
South cooperation seeks to enable developing countries to play a more active 
role in international policy and decision-making processes, in support of their 
efforts to achieve sustainable development.”). 
 69. See Marrakech Framework of Implementation of South-South 
Cooperation (2003), art. 3, http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-
Framework.htm [hereinafter Marrakech Framework]. 
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 According to the Food and Agricultural Organization, 
Africa “is the only region of the developing world where 
the regional average of food production per person has 
been declining over the last 40 years”; 
 Africa is the only continent not on track to meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals; and 
 Africa’s infrastructure deficiency is legendry and the 
worst when compared to other regions in the world.  
African economies need new markets for their traditional 
export and need new arrangements that will advance their 
individual and collective goal for export diversification, 
industrialization, and structural transformation. South-South 
trade and investment also holds the key to the continent’s goal 
of expanding trade in commodities, services and investment, 
“leapfrogging,” building productive capacities, enhancing 
competitiveness, and developing new complementarities. 
South-South trade is also a good launching pad for greater 
involvement and participation in the global market and offers 
immense opportunities for countries in the region to develop 
and test new trade-able goods.70  
A. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
Evidence suggests that developing countries are playing an 
increasing role in Africa’s trade and investment (Fig. 1). While 
not replacing the continent’s traditional partners, key 
developing countries, particularly China and India, are 
becoming more dominant; China is now considered “the biggest 
player in Angola’s post-war reconstruction process,” and has 
made inroads in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Tanzania.71 In 2006, India’s imports from Africa stood at 
US$12.6 billion, up from about US$6 billion in 1999.72 Also as 
of 2006, Brazil’s import from Africa stood at US$8.1 billion, up 
from about US$2 billion in 1998. Overall, the period from 2000-
2010 saw: 
 “a marked shift in the geography of [Africa’s] trade, with 
non-African developing countries now accounting for a 
 
 70. See UNCTAD Background Paper 2004, supra note 41. 
 71. See generally, China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction 
and Infrastructure Sectors, CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES (2006), 
http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/dfid-3rd-edition.pdf. 
 72. The African Trading Relationship with India, TRADE LAW CENTRE 
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (TRALAC), http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1
694/AfricanTradingRelationshipIndia.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). 
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much larger share than in previous decades;”73 
 an increase in the importance of developing countries in 
Africa’s merchandise trade; 
 non-African developing countries trading with Africa 
almost as much as developed countries; 
 a reduction in the share of African trade going to the 
continent’s traditional partners in Europe and North 
America; 
 a decline in United States’ share of African trade 
compared to the early 1980s; 
 a decline in European Union share of African export 
compared to the mid-1980s. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Computed using IMF Direction of Trade data. Economic 
Development in Africa Report 2010. 
Developing countries that import from Africa appear to be 
primarily interested in commodities. Over the last decade, and 
for most major developing country export markets, the share of 
total imports from Africa that is made up of manufactured 
 
 73. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, at 29, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALOC/AFRICA/2010, 
U.N. Sales No. E.10.11.d.13 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA REPORT 2010]. 
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goods has declined steadily. Primary products account for 80% 
of Africa’s export to Turkey, even though the period from 2000 
and 2008 saw a slight increase in the share of manufactured 
goods in the continent’s export. What is evident then is that 
Africa-South trade exhibits strong similarity with Africa-North 
trade: the dominance of primary products in the continent’s 
export and the dominance of manufactured goods in the 
continent’s import.74 Primary products account for 14% of 
Africa’s import from the developed world and 22% from 
developing countries in 2008, while low, medium, and high 
technology accounted for 69% of the continent’s import from 
developed countries, and 56% of the continent’s import from 
developing countries in 2008.  
B. AFRICA-SOUTH INVESTMENT: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
Africa is also benefiting from the boom in South-South 
investment. Unlike FDI in other regions, which is frequently 
dominated by the private sector, “a particular feature of FDI 
from the South to Africa is the frequent involvement of 
governments or state owned enterprises.”75 Asia is becoming a 
principal player in terms of FDI flow to Africa (Figure 2). In 
2008, the top five developing country investor in Africa were: 
Singapore (US$9,826 million), China (US$7,804 million), Hong 
Kong China (US$5,268 million), Malaysia (US$3,718 million), 
and India (US$2,652 million). Indian investment is expanding 
beyond Mauritius, its traditional base in the continent, and is 
now extending to countries such as Senegal and Sudan. 
Although FDI from Latin American countries is low compared 
to that from Asia, the influence of countries like Brazil is felt in 
many countries in the continent.76  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74. Like her import from developed countries, Africa’s import from other 
developing countries is dominated by manufactures. 
 75. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
81. 
 76. Id. at 88 (nothing that the Brazil’s energy giant Petrobras has 
operations in about six countries in Africa and that Brazil’s mining company 
has a presence in seven countries in the continent). 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database. Economic Development in Africa 
Report 2010. 
Perhaps indicating an increase in South-South FDI in 
Africa is the increase in BITs and DTTs concluded between 
countries in Africa and other developing countries. In 1998, 
only 133 BITs were concluded between countries in Africa and 
other developing countries, but by the end of 2008, the number 
had jumped to 335. 
C. AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO SOUTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AGENDA 
Countries in Africa appear to fully embrace the South-
South agenda and are exploring ways to maximize the 
opportunity that South-South cooperation presents. In a 2005 
Decision, the Executive Council of the Africa Union 
“[w]elcome[d] the third round of the Global System of Trade 
Preferences . . . ” and “encourage[d] African countries to engage 
actively in those negotiations.”77 In a 2005 speech to the 
African Union Commission, the President of Tanzania, 
Benjamin Mkapa, argued that Africa must strive to change the 
direction of the continent’s trade by ensuring that the continent 
 
 77. African Union, Exec. Council, Decision on Trade and Investment in 
Africa, Ex.CL/Dec.205 (VII) (2005). 
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trades more with Asia and Latin America as a deliberate 
continental strategy to diversify exports markets and sources of 
investment. According to him:  
The time has come for a strategic new geography of trade taking 
advantage of enormous natural resources in Africa and Asia, as well 
as the rapid development that has made East and South Asia major 
markets for manufacturers as well as primary commodities in which 
Africa has a competitive advantage. Under these circumstances there 
is no reason why, with political will on both sides, countries such as 
China and India cannot be major markets for African producers, and 
Africa emerge as an important market for basic Asian manufactured 
goods, while, at the same time, African manufacturing capacity is 
being built with Asian investment I am glad to note that already 
China and India are major sources of investment in Africa.78 
The first Africa-South America Summit took place from 
November 26–30, 2006. In a resolution adopted at the 
conference, the Heads of State and Government of Africa and 
South America resolved to establish an Africa-South America 
Cooperative Forum of State and Government, and also resolved 
to “[a]dopt strategies and measures that will translate the 
vision of the Africa-South America Cooperative Forum into 
concrete economic, political and social benefits for our 
peoples . . . [i]mmediately activate and implement all bilateral 
agreements between countries in the two regions,” and to 
“[i]ntensify cooperation and consultation at all levels to exploit 
the immense opportunities which abound in our two 
continents.” 79 In a 2005 Decision, the Executive Council of the 
African Union “reiterate[d] its commitment for a new and 
mutually advantageous partnership with Asia Countries”80 and 
stressed the need “to continually engage in active dialogue that 
will consolidate and strengthen the partnership between Africa 
and Asia.” 
 
 78. Benjamin Mkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Speech to the African Union Commission, http://www.africa-
union.org/VISITS/Tanzania%20Pdt%2031aug05/SPEECH%20BY%20THE%20
PRESIDENT%20OF%20THE%20UNITED%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20TANZA
NIA.htm (Aug. 31, 2005). 
 79. Africa-South America Summit, Abuja, Nigeria, Nov. 26–30, 2006, 
Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative Forum (Nov. 30, 2006), 
http://chede.org/chede/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/30-12-09-Resolution-of-
first-Africa-South-America-summit-in-Abuja.pdf.  
 80. African Union, Exec. Council, Decision on the Report on the New 
Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership, DOC.EX.CL/198 (VII) (2005). 
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IV. SINO-AFRICA TRADE: EVOLUTION, TRENDS, AND 
PERSPECTIVES 
The year 2010 marked the tenth anniversary of the Forum 
on China-Africa Trade, the platform for cooperation that has 
guided and promoted the development of China-Africa relations 
over the past decade. The past decade saw a deepening and 
strengthening of China-Africa cooperation on a broad range of 
areas. As of 2008, China-Africa trade exceeded US$100 billion, 
some 53 African countries were trading with China, and China 
had begun the construction of six economic and trade 
cooperation zones in Africa. An estimated 1,600 Chinese 
enterprises have started business in African countries with a 
direct investment stock of US$7.8 billion.81 Also in the past 
decade, China’s assistance to Africa doubled, China delivered 
on earlier commitments to cancel the debt of the heavily 
indebted poor countries and LDCs in the continent, and has 
provided concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s 
credit for infrastructure and other projects in Africa.82 In 
November 2009, foreign ministers from the two sides met in 
Sharm El Sheik, Egypt for the 4th Ministerial Conference of 
FOCAC under the theme “deepening the new type of China-
Africa strategic partnership for sustainable development.” 
Speaking at the 4th Ministerial Conference, H.E. Wen Jiabao 
stated that China’s plan to cancel US$168 million debts owed 
by 33 African countries was near completion, that the US$5 
billion of concessional loans will be fully in place soon, and that 
the China-Africa Development Fund, whose first tranche 
reached US$1 billion, became operational as scheduled. He also 
declared that “China [was] ready to deepen practical 
cooperation with African countries in diverse areas and push 
forward in an all-round way the new type of China-Africa 
strategic partnership.”83 
A. TRENDS IN SINO-AFRICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
Today, China is Africa’s largest developing country trade 
 
 81. Wen Jiabao, Premier St. Council China, Speech at the Opening 
Ceremony of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t627391.ht
m. 
 82. Yang Jiechi, Minister Foreign Aff. China, Report at the 4th 
Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Nov. 8, 
2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t627658.htm. 
 83. Id.  
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partner, accounting for about 11% of the continent’s external 
trade, and is Africa’s largest source of imports. UNCTAD 
suggests that the expansion of trade between China and Africa 
is the main driver of the increasing share of developing 
countries in Africa’s trade. Trade between China and countries 
in Africa has grown since 2000. Trade volume between China 
and Africa stood at US$10 billion in 2000, US$39.7 billion in 
2005, and topped US$106.8 billion in 2008—hitting and 
exceeding the target of US$100 billion. Annual trade between 
Africa and China is now in the region of US$37.7 billion. 
Between 1995 and 2009, the China-Africa trade grew by 25%. 
The figures are even more dramatic when China’s trade with 
individual countries is examined: 
 between 2002 and 2005, China-Angola trade increased 
by nearly 41.6% from US$1.148 billion in 2002 to 
US$6.95 billion in 2005;84  
 between 2003 and 2004 Sierra Leone’s export to China 
increased from zero to US$1.61 million; and 
 trade between China and Tanzania increased by 524% 
between 2000 and 2005 to reach over US$475 million. 
China’s investment in Africa is also growing and 
expanding to involve more sectors. Chinese companies 
represent a new and significant source of development capital 
for countries in Africa. Between 1991 and 2008, 33% of cross 
border mergers and acquisition (M&A) concluded by developing 
country TNC’s involved Chinese companies. Since 2000, China 
has encouraged Chinese companies to invest and explore 
business opportunities in Africa. China has also fulfilled a 
promise, made in 2006, to set up a China-Africa development 
fund (Cadfund), with funds that will eventually reach US$5 
billion.85 Chinese FDI in the first quarter of 2010 increased by 
81% to US$552 million. To advance China-Africa cooperation, 
four programs of action have been adopted since 2000: (i) the 
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and 
Social Development, adopted in October 2000; (ii) the Addis 
Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006, adopted in 2003; (iii) the Beijing 
 
 84. CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES, CHINA’S INTEREST AND ACTIVITY IN 
AFRICA’S CONSTRUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS (2006).  
 85. See CHINA-AFRICA DEVELOPMENT FUND (CADFUND), 
http://www.cadfund.com/en/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (noting that 
the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND) was officially opened on 
June 26th, 2007, with first-phase funding, USD 1 billion, provided by China 
Development Bank). 
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Action Plan 2007-2009, adopted in November 2007; and (iv) the 
Sharm El Sheik Action Plan 2010-2010, adopted in 2009. The 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum is the platform for dialogue 
between the two sides. 
B. PRINCIPLES GUIDING CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION 
China has repeatedly rejected any notion that there is a 
fundamental clash of interests. In 2000, Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan stated: “We have no conflict of fundamental interests. 
Rather, we share extensive common interests in safeguarding 
peace and promoting development.” In all the exchanges and 
documents emanating from the FOCAC, certain core principles 
have been repeatedly stressed: political equality, mutual trust, 
economic win-win cooperation,86 and balanced two-way trade.87 
The FOCAC has also repeatedly endorsed the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence.88  
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA-AFRICA ECONOMIC 
ARRANGEMENT 
A follow-up mechanism was addressed in the Programme 
for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development, adopted in October 2000 at the first Ministerial 
Conference. In the 2000 document, the two sides agreed to 
establish corresponding committees for follow-up actions of the 
Forum on China-Africa Co-operation at the ministerial level 
and to set up joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels. 
FOCAC is now in its tenth year. FOCAC is described as a 
platform “for collective consultation and dialogue and a 
cooperation mechanism” with the characteristic of “pragmatic 
cooperation” and “equality and mutual benefit.” In the past ten 
 
 86. See Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Nov. 5, 2006), 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t606841.htm (“We hereby 
solemnly proclaim the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership 
between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, 
economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges.”). 
 87. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation—Addis Ababa Plan of Action, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, at para. 
4.3.2 (Dec. 26, 2003), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/Second/t57032.htm. 
 88. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, EMBASSY OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, at 
para. 4.2 (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgx/zfhzlt/t2
81763.htm.  
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years, the FOCAC has concluded four ministerial meetings89 
and one summit meeting.90 Monitoring and implementation is 
carried out through a multi-level dialogue mechanism as 
envisaged in the 2000 Document: (1) the ministerial meeting 
every three years, (2) meeting of senior officials every two 
years, (3) foreign ministries’ political consultations and 
strategic dialogue (now with 28 African countries), and (4) 
dialogue between the Secretariat of Chinese FOCAC Follow-up 
Committee and African diplomatic corps in China. The Chinese 
government established the Follow-up Committee of FOCAC 
soon after the first Ministerial conference in 2000. The 
Committee is presently made up of 27 members drawn from all 
the relevant ministries including the ministry of Commerce, 
Finance, Health, Education, Land and Resource, and 
Education. It is not clear how many African countries have 
established similar follow-up committees. 
D. AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SINO-AFRICA TRADE 
Africans leaders have enthusiastically embraced China’s 
Africa agenda. In a speech at the Second Political Consultation 
between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers, the 
Chairperson of the Commission of the Africa Union, H.E. Dr. 
Jean Ping, called China “one of Africa’s longest and most 
faithful partners” noting that “[t]his partnership has brought 
many dividends to both China and Africa, and seems poised to 
be even more beneficial in the future.”91 While labor unions and 
human rights organizations express skepticism regarding 
China’s engagement in Africa, the reaction of policy makers in 
Africa has been different. “I can confirm that China has 
remained faithful to the commitment it made on issues of 
international importance,” Dr. Ping told his audience noting 
particularly China’s commitment to complete the new Africa 
 
 89. The first ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Beijing from 
October 10–12, 2000. The Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was 
convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from December 15–16, 2003. The third 
ministerial conference of FOCAC was held in Beijing from November 4–5, 
2006. The fourth Ministerial Conference was held in Sharm El Sheik from 
November 8–10, 2009.  
 90. The Beijing Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was 
held from November 4–5, 2006. 
 91. H.E. Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson Comm’n Afr. Union, Speech at the 
Second Political Consultation between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers, 
2, http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/Speech%20by%20the%20CP-New
%20York-23%20Sept%20%20VERSION%20ANGLAISE%20Discours%20avec
%20les%20Chinois.pdf (Sep. 23, 2010).  
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Union Commission office and Conference Center complex.92 In 
a remark at the fourth Ministerial conference, the President of 
the Republic of Liberia, H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, remarked 
that “Liberia considers FOCAC an important mechanism for 
the development of Africa.”93 She noted several 
accomplishments in Liberia thanks to the help from China, 
including: contributions to Liberia’s debt relief program under 
the HIPC arrangement; the establishment of an Anti-Malaria 
Center and medical teams at Liberia’s largest hospital; the 
construction of new facilities at the University of Liberia 
Campus; a modern hospital in one of Liberia’s rural counties; 
an Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center; the 
construction of three modern primary schools in high 
population communities in Liberia and military barracks; 
scholarships to over 100 Liberian students to attend 
universities in China; and over 400 commodities identified to 
penetrate China markets. Speaking at the same conference, the 
Vice-President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, commented 
that “China’s post FOCAC intervention in Ghana’s socio-
economic development has been remarkable and visible.”94 
According to him, “[m]any more Ghanaian entrepreneurs, 
business people and students have made China their preferred 
destination.”95 
V. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
COOPERATION: A CRITIQUE 
UNCTAD sees the growing relationship between Africa 
and Southern partners as “a welcome development.”96 To 
UNCTAD, the new arrangements have “great potential to 
support the development of productive capacity and contribute 
to the achievements of sustained growth and poverty reduction 
in the region.”97 A thorough examination of the evolving 
 
 92. Id. at 4–5. 
 93. H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President Liber., Remarks at the Opening 
Ceremony of 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation, http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t632439.htm (Nov. 8, 
2009). 
 94.  H.E. Mr. John Dramani Mahama, Vice President of Ghana, Statement 
at the Opening Session of the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/zyjh/t632435.htm (Nov. 8, 2009). 
 95. Id. 
 96. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
26. 
 97. Id.  
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relationship between Africa and Southern partners suggests 
that there are good aspects to these arrangements and 
troubling aspects as well. Moreover, any positive dividend is 
not automatically delivered but may depend on the extent to 
which African economies proactively exploit and maximize the 
potential benefits.98 Evaluating the benefit to Africa of Africa-
South trade and investment is made difficult by the complexity 
of evolving cooperation arrangements; most are multi-sectoral 
and involve many countries at vastly different levels of 
development and implicate multiple sectors of the economy. In 
general, China-Africa relation has evolved into a multi-
dimensional cooperation system covering political, economic, 
social and cultural aspects. Consequently, a focus on trade and 
investment may not adequately capture developments in other 
respects. 
A. THE GOOD: POSITIVE ASPECTS OF AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT COOPERATION  
1. New Sources of International Capital and New Markets for 
Export.  
South-South trade represents a new and welcomed source 
of finance for most countries in Africa. The fact that some 
emerging economies are projected to become the main engine of 
new demand growth and spending power in the near future 
means that Africa ignores South-South cooperation at its peril. 
Projections about the BRIC countries suggest that South-South 
trade and investment must become part of Africa’s 
development strategy. According to Goldman Sachs, in less 
than 40 years, the BRIC economies together “could be larger 
than the G6 in US dollar terms and could account for over half 
of the size of the G6 by 2025.99 The paper projects that China 
“could overtake Germany in the next four years, Japan by 2015 
and the US by 2039.”100 In terms of economic growth, Goldman 
Sachs also projects that about two-thirds of the increase in the 
GDP from the BRICS would come from higher real growth. In 
terms of global demand pattern, Goldman Sachs further 
 
 98. Id. at 26 (noting that the potential benefits of Africa-South 
arrangements “can only be realized to the extent that African countries are 
more proactive in the process and use the leverage they have with Southern 
partners to persuade them to strike a balance between their commercial or 
strategic interests and the region’s development needs.”). 
 99.  Goldman Sachs No: 99, supra note 1. 
 100.  Id. 
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projects that by 2025, “the annual increase in . . . spending 
power from the BRICs could be twice that of the G6, and four 
times higher by 2050.”101 Given declining aid to Africa from 
traditional sources, projections of accelerated outward 
investment from countries like China will be welcomed news.102 
The top 12 EMNCs from China reportedly control over US$30 
billion in foreign assets and US$33 billion in foreign sales;103 
among developing countries, China is now one of the top FDI 
exporters—making it an attractive partner to most African 
governments.104 Developing countries are also potential 
markets for Africa’s export. Given tariff and non-tariff barriers 
in some Northern countries, access to markets in other 
developing countries is important to countries in Africa. 
Available data suggests that South-South cooperation is 
boosting Africa’s trade to developing countries. In 1995, trade 
with Africa represented only 1% of China’s total world trade; 
the number slowly increased between 1995 and 2006 to 
between 3% and 4%. By and large, South-South trade and 
investment presents much-needed opportunity for Africa to 
diversify its economic partners. Whether this means Africa 
abandoning its traditional partners is a more contested issue. 
“For Africa’s development and integration we have depended on 
the Western world—we cannot continue to proceed like this,” 
AU’s economic chief, Maxwell Mkwezalamba, is reported as 
saying.105 According to Mkwezalamba, speaking at the AU 
Summit in Uganda, “[W]e need to diversify our partners that 
we work with and hence for us, working with China is 
something that we have welcomed.”106 
2. Multidimensional and Multi-Sectoral Partnerships  
Unfolding Africa-South arrangements are 
multidimensional and implicate multiple sectors of the 
economy. South-South cooperation thus offers advantages to 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102. See John Wong & Sarah Chan, China’s Outward Direct Investment: 
Expanding World Wide, 1 CHINA: INT’L J. 273 (2003) (noting that China’s 
economy can sustain significant capital outflow for investment purposes). 
 103. Id. at 276.  
 104. Id. at 277 (noting that China’s share of OFDI rose from 0.2% in 1980 
to 3.6% in 2001.  
 105. Ahmed M. Kamara, China Gets Massive Endorsement from the 
African Union, NEWSTIME AFRICA (July 25, 2010, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/13409. 
 106.  Id. 
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Africa beyond the trade and investment arena. In areas such as 
science and technology, rural development, energy and solid 
minerals, water resources, and infrastructure development, 
there is much that Africa could gain from South-South 
cooperation. Within the context of Africa-South America 
relations, cooperation and partnership in energy is currently 
under discussion. In the Abuja Plan of Action adopted at the 
conclusion of the first Africa-South America Summit, the two 
sides agreed to “exchange information on how to achieve skills 
and technology transfer in the extractive industries,” “explore 
the possibility of developing a common energy strategy,” “share 
experiences and develop capacity for the exploration of energy 
resources and efficient energy marketing systems,” and 
“cooperate in the development of alternative sources of energy 
and promote the use of renewable energy sources and hybrid 
energy technologies.”107 The first Africa-South America (ASA) 
Joint Conference of Ministers in Charge of Energy convened in 
July 2009 with the goal of moving the agenda forward.108 
Reflecting the multi-sectoral, multi-faceted nature of the 
unfolding relationship, at the fourth FOCAC Ministerial 
Conference, Chinese Premier H.E. Wen Jiabao, announced that 
in the next three years, the Chinese government will: establish 
a China-Africa partnership in addressing climate change; 
enhance cooperation with Africa in science and technology; 
deepen cooperation in medical care and health; and enhance 
cooperation in human resources development and education. 
3. Collaborative Learning and Technology Transfer  
Africa-South trade and investment also provides an 
opportunity for African countries to address the growing 
technology gap through effective and cost-effective technology 
transfer arrangements.109 South-South technology transfer has 
 
 107.  First Africa-South America (ASA) Summit, Abuja, Nig., Nov. 26–30, 
2006, Abuja Plan of Action (2006). 
 108. See ASA Joint Conference of Ministers in Charge of Engery, Addis 
Ababa, Eth., July 13–17, 2009, Cooperation & Partnership in Energy Under 
the Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF): Concept and 
Strategy (2009) (“Due to the growing aspirations for close cooperation between 
Africa and South America for the sake of sustainable socioeconomic 
development of their countries and peoples, the leaders of the two continents 
convened in a Summit Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 26–30 November 2006 
and agreed to promote such objectives in an organized and rapid manner.”). 
 109. In October 2002, the Group of 77 convened its first high-level 
conference on South-South cooperation in science and technology in Dubai, 
with the participation of the Member States and more than 150 scientists from 
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become more possible as emerging developing countries make 
strides in the fields of science and technology. In 2007, China, 
for the first time, became the second highest investor in R&D 
after the United States. Africa can learn from other developing 
countries and “leapfrog” some of the development challenges 
the continent is currently facing or will face in the future. 
Technical cooperation features strongly in China-Africa 
cooperation. In the last decade, China has sent hundreds of 
senior experts on agricultural technology to Africa, set up 
demonstration centers of agricultural technology in some 
countries, and increased Chinese investment in African 
agriculture.110 In the Beijing Action Plan of 2006, the two sides 
also agreed to “promote cooperation in the development, 
application and transfer of technologies.”111 Specifically, China 
promised to “continue to provide training courses of practical 
technologies and carry out demonstration projects of technical 
assistance for extending China’s scientific and technological 
achievements and applicable technologies in Africa.”112 In 2009, 
China pledged to increase the number of Chinese government 
scholarships to Africa to 5,500 by 2012, to train a total of 
20,000 professionals of various fields for Africa over the next 
three years, and to launch a China-Africa joint research and 
exchange program. 
4. Preferential Market Access 
A new and interesting development in South-South 
economic relations is the use of preferential market access 
schemes as a foreign policy instrument. Developing countries 
such as China are now providing preferential market access to 
 
developing countries. They discussed how to intensify cooperation. The 
meeting adopted the Declaration on the Promotion of Science and Technology 
in the South. See Group of 77 South-South High-Level Conference on Science 
and Technology, Dubai, U.A.E., Oct. 27–30, 2002, Dubai Declaration for the 
Promotion of Science and Technology in the South (Oct. 30, 2002), 
http://www.g77.org/sshlcst/Dubai-Declaration.htm. 
 110. See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, supra 
note 88, at para. 3.1.3 (stating that China agrees to: send 100 senior experts 
on agricultural technologies to Africa, set up in Africa 10 demonstration 
centers of agricultural technology, “give encouragement and support to 
Chinese enterprises in expanding their investment in agriculture in Africa 
and get more involved in agricultural infrastructure development, production 
of agricultural machinery and processing of agricultural produce in Africa” 
and “[s]tep up cooperation with Africa in extending applicable technologies 
and human resources training in agriculture.”). 
 111.  Beijing Action Plan, supra note 88. 
 112. Id. at para. 3.7.1. 
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products originating from LDCs. Considering that 33 of the 48 
LDC’s on the UN list are in Africa, such schemes present an 
opportunity for these countries to develop and diversify their 
exports. Preferential market access schemes can stimulate 
sustained export-led growth in recipient nations. In the Delhi 
Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the India-Africa 
Summit in 2008, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to 
“providing meaningful market access to the Least Developed 
Countries.”113 China started to grant zero-tariff treatment to 
some commodities of African LDCs destined for China in 2005. 
Following the 2006 Beijing Summit, China expanded the tariff 
exemption list to 478 kinds of products from African LDCs. In 
2009, Beijing pledged to “phase in zero-tariff treatment to 95 
percent of the products from the least developed African 
countries having diplomatic relations with China, starting with 
60% of the products within 2010.”114 It is expected that by 2013, 
the tariff exemption list will expand to cover some 4,700 
products (up from 478 products in 2006).115  
The effectiveness of China’s preference scheme has not 
been seriously evaluated. A comparison of China’s market 
access offers with similar offers from developed countries such 
as the United Kingdom (Everything But Arms initiative 
implemented in 2001) and United States (African Growth 
Opportunity Act implemented in 2000) is outside the scope of 
this paper. China claims that its market access offers has 
generated considerable benefits including advancing more than 
US$1 billion worth of African exports to China.116 It is not clear 
how factors such as non-tariff barriers, cost of documentation, 
rules of origin, and China’s preferential scheme to LDCs in 
Asia affect the economic potential of China’s Africa preference 
scheme. In a 2007 paper, Philip Alves, an economist at the 
South African Institute for International Affairs, concluded, 
regarding the earlier preference, that:  
Chinese authorities have designed a preference scheme well-fitted to 
the export capacity of the benefiting African economies, yet it will 
likely have only a small economic impact. With an implicit transfer of 
 
 113. India-Africa Forum Summit 2008, New Delhi, India, Apr. 8–9, 2008, 
Dehli Declaration, para. 11 (Apr. 8, 2008). 
 114. Id. 
 115. China Ministry of Commerce, An Interpretation of New Measures on 
Economic and Trade Cooperation from the 4th Ministerial Conference, F. ON 
CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (May 24, 2010), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfz
c/t696509.htm. 
 116. Id.  
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about US$ 10 [sic] million per year spread across 30 countries, the 
estimated economic value is only about 1.2% of these countries’ non-
oil exports to China. As Table 2 shows, about half of the beneficiaries 
may see an implicit transfer of less than US$ 100,000 [sic] per year. 
Barring an incredible supply response in Africa, the preferences will 
not much alter the trade flows to China, and certainly will not close 
the bilateral trade deficits run by Africa’s non-oil economies.117 
The jury is still out on the overall effectiveness of China’s 
preference scheme for African LDCs. On the one hand, the 
scheme appears to be permanent, is carefully tailored to the 
export capacity of African LDCs (some 88% of covered products 
are current exports of the LDCs), and the average margin of 
preference for products of interest to the LDCs are sizeable 
(about 10.4%). On the other hand, some products vital to export 
of some African LDCs are excluded (for example, cotton is 
excluded), China’s rules of origin are very strict, and African 
LDCs still face competition from Asian LDCs for the Chinese 
market.118 
5. Commercial Infrastructure Development  
Africa’s infrastructure deficiency is notorious, long-
standing, and implicates almost all forms of infrastructure. 
Poor and/or inadequate infrastructure is a major impediment to 
Africa’s development, particularly the continent’s goal of 
industrialization, diversification, and regional integration. 
African leaders now recognize this to be a problem.119 As much 
as US$22 billion per year in investment and US$17 billion for 
maintenance is needed to address Africa’s infrastructure 
 
 117. Philip Alves, China’s Preferential Trade Policy as a Foreign Policy 
Tool, in NEW IMPULSES FROM THE SOUTH: CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF AFRICA 
28, 36 (Hannah Edinger, Hayley Herman & Johanna Jansson, eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-_New_Impulses_from_the_
South_-_May_08.pdf. 
 118. Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/1108
01.htm (noting that preferential access schemes for poor countries have 
frequently proven not to be very effective at increasing market access for the 
intended beneficiaries because the schemes frequently exclude the highly 
protected products of most interest to exporters in the poorest countries and 
“are often complex, nontransparent, and subject to various exemptions and 
conditions . . . that limit benefits.”). 
 119. See generally COMM’N FOR AFR., OUR COMMON INTEREST: REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (2005), available at 
http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/view/00010595.pdf (concluding that 
substantial and sustained levels of finance, as much as 5% of the continent’s 
GDP, is needed to close Africa’s infrastructure deficit).  
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deficits.120 South-South partnership is offering new sources of 
infrastructure finance for Africa on a scale now comparable to 
traditional official development assistance (ODA) from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) or to capital from private investors.121 A recent study 
found that at least 35 countries in Africa have infrastructure 
finance deals with China, Chinese finance “is on a scale large 
enough to make a material contribution towards meeting 
Africa’s vast infrastructure needs,” and other Southern 
partners, including India and the Gulf states, are playing an 
increasing role as infrastructure financiers.122 According to this 
study, as of 2006, China’s financial commitments to the African 
infrastructure project stood at US$7 billion, up from around 
US$0.5 billion per year in 2001–03 and US$1.5 billion per year 
in 2004–05. The two largest beneficiary sectors of Chinese 
finance are power and transport—sectors where the need is 
acute and potential benefit could be quite significant. Together, 
power and transport account for 66.6% of Chinese 
infrastructure commitment in sub-Saharan Africa between 
2001 and 2007. Infrastructure development, particularly the 
need to develop direct air routes and to rationalize sea routes 
between the two regions, is one of the areas of cooperation 
identified in the 2006 Declaration of the First Africa-South 
America Summit.123 Pursuant to the declaration, the two sides 
agreed to “form a basis for mutual exchange and support in the 
area of infrastructure development.”124  
6. Agricultural Technology 
The field of agriculture is one area where Africa needs 
urgent help. Africa’s agriculture is in crisis.125 According to the 
 
 120. VIVIEN FOSTER, WILLIAM BUTTERFIELD, CHUAN CHEN & NATALIYA 
PUSHAK, BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA’S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE 
FINANCIER FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 33 (The World Bank, Trends & Policy 
Options No. 5, 2009) [hereinafter BUILDING BRIDGES]. 
 121. Id. at xi. 
 122. Id. at xi–xii, xviii.  
 123. Africa-South America Summit, Abuja, Niger., Nov. 26–30, 2006, Abuja 
Declaration, ¶ 29, ASA/Summit/doc.01(I). 
 124.  First Africa-South America (ASA) Summit, Abuja, Nig., Nov. 26–30, 
2006, Abuja Declaration (2006), http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/AFRISOUTDEC
L.PDF. 
 125. The problem is not new, however, and has long been recognized by 
African leaders in documents such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1963, the 
Abuja Treaty of 1991, NEPADs, Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP), and the Abuja Food Security Summit 
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Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Africa “is the only 
region of the developing world where the regional average of 
food production per person has been declining over the last 40 
years.”126 Despite the recognized importance of agriculture to 
the economies of most countries in the continent, agricultural 
productivity remains low and in decline in some countries. 
According to one report: 
 Since the 1970s, agricultural imports into Africa have 
been rising faster than exports; 
 Since 1980, the continent as a whole has been a net 
agricultural importing region; 
 Africa’s agricultural export feature a small number of 
traditional commodities; 
 Africa’s agricultural export patterns indicate a strong 
dependence on preferential access to a few developed-
country markets.  
 In the 1970s, Africa spent less than US$5 billion on 
agricultural imports; by 2005, the continent was 
spending well above US$25 billion on agricultural 
imports. 
Cooperation in the agricultural sector is another area that 
promises immense dividends to Africa. Since 2000, Beijing has 
pledged support for agricultural development in Africa. 
Cooperation has come in various forms. At the 4th Ministerial 
Conference, Beijing pledged to enhance cooperation by 
increasing the number of agricultural technology 
demonstration centers built by China in Africa to twenty, 
sending fifty agricultural technology teams to Africa, and 
training 2,000 agricultural technology personnel for Africa.127 
Technical assistance in this sector can help Africa address 
supply side constraints, boost agricultural productivity, and 
attain food security.  
Cooperation with China in the field of agriculture targets 
some of the pillars identified in the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Programme such as Pillar 4 
(“development of agricultural research, technology 
 
Declaration of December 2008. 
 126. Florence Chenoweth, The Role of Agricultural Development in the 
Achievement of the MDGs, MDG GLOBAL WATCH, http://www.mdg-
globalwatch.org/florence_chenoweth.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 127. Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, Nov. 8–9, 2009, Sharm El Sheikh 
Action Plan, ¶ 4.1.4 (Nov. 12, 2009). 
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dissemination and adoption”) and Pillar 5 (“sustainable 
development of livestock, fisheries and forestry resources.”).128 
The launch in June 2010 of the Africa-Brazil Agricultural 
Innovation Marketplace (Marketplace) offers another example 
of promising South-South cooperation in the field of 
agriculture.129 The Marketplace is described as a “south-south 
partnership to foster agricultural research and innovation for 
development by supporting policy dialogue and collaborative 
projects.”130 
7. Strategic Coalitions and Trade Negotiations  
South-South economic cooperation provides an opportunity 
for countries in Africa to enhance their participation in the 
multilateral trade system through strategic coalitions. In the 
last decade, issue-based coalitions have emerged as a feature of 
multilateral trade negotiations. African countries have sought 
to advance their agenda and defend their interest through 
different coalitions including the Africa Group, the LDC Group, 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, the Group of 
33, the Group of 20, the NAMA-11, and the Group of 90. 
UNCTAD attributes this developing-country activism for the 
incorporation of development issues in the Doha Work 
Programme. UNCTAD is also of the view that Africa’s 
cooperation with developing countries in multilateral trade 
negotiations has helped the continent to influence the agenda 
and pace of the Doha Round negotiations and increase their 
level of participation in the negotiation process more generally. 
Although African countries have increased their participation 
in trade negotiations and although it has been increasingly 
difficult for developed countries to set the tone, agenda, and 
outcome of negotiations, the benefit to Africa of South-South 
cooperation in trade negotiations must not be exaggerated. On 
 
 128. Initiative in Support to NEPAD-CAADP Implementation, FOOD & 
AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/tc/tca/nepad/caadp_en.asp 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 129. The Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace is a described 
as a multiparty international initiative involving the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa (FARA), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(Embrapa), the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the 
World Bank (WB) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). See General 
Information, AFR.-BRAZ. AGRIC. INNOVATION MARKETPLACE, 
http://www.africa-brazil.org/home/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).  
 130. FAQ, AFR.-BRAZ. AGRIC. INNOVATION MARKETPLACE, 
http://www.africa-brazil.org/home/faq (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).  
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the positive side, gains such as the launch of the development 
round, the gradual death of the Singapore issues, and the Doha 
Declaration on Health and Human Rights would probably not 
have come about without strong solidarity by developing 
countries. However, on close examination, it could be argued 
that the voices of African countries have not been heard on the 
most important issues on the Doha agenda; African proposals 
on a host of issues have been virtually ignored. Furthermore, 
although African ministers have facilitated or co-facilitated 
some past WTO ministerial conferences,131 that in and of itself 
should not be taken as evidence that the continent is taken 
seriously in trade negotiations or that the continent can 
influence critical decisions.132 
The marked differences in the size and fate of the 
economies that make up the developing country group makes 
suspect claims that the interests of African countries are 
adequately represented in South-South trade coalitions; the 
areas of common interest are few and insignificant while the 
areas of divergent interests are many and hugely significant. 
Issues such as agricultural market access, NAMA, and 
preference erosion have in the past divided developing 
countries. The argument is not that coalitions in trade 
negotiations are not useful or that African countries should not 
cultivate links with other developing countries on the many 
issues that are on the Doha Development Agenda. However, 
Africa must pay attention to areas of divergent interests and 
must not hesitate to call out other developing countries when 
their position in trade negotiations is likely to harm the 
continent’s interests. 
B. THE BAD: NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF AFRICA-SOUTH ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS  
1. Underutilization/Barriers to Trade  
Despite the benefits of South-South economic cooperation, 
the potential for interregional trade remains underutilized by 
countries in Africa. It is estimated that only 27% of intra-South 
 
 131. Cancun Ministerial (Kenyan Minister of Trade served as facilitator); 
Hong Kong Ministerial (Zambian Minister of Trade and Nigerian Minister of 
Commerce were co-facilitators.). 
 132. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
46 (suggesting that choosing African trade ministers to facilitate the 
Ministerial conference represents “important changes in the WTO negotiation 
process in response to the increasing bargaining power of African countries.”). 
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trade in agriculture and a mere 12% of intra-South trade in 
manufacturing are conducted on an interregional basis.133 
Africa’s trade as a share of trade of many developing countries 
is still very low: China (10.6%), India (3.5), Brazil (2.6%), Saudi 
Arabia (2.4%), Turkey (1.9%), United Arab Emirates (1.4%), 
Republic of Korea (1.2%) and Russian Federation (1.2%). 
Asymmetries in the economic relations between Africa and key 
Southern partners are a major concern and undermine claims 
that South-South can lead to win-win outcomes. Non-
traditional barriers to trade impede Africa’s export and erode 
any benefit the continent might have gained from available 
preferential access schemes. One 2004 report found that:  
 Average applied tariff of developing countries are above 
developed country rates, despite liberalization attempts 
in the past decade;134 
 Approximately 70% of tariffs that developing country 
exporters face are applied by other developing 
countries;  
 Developing country service trade barriers are also 
significantly higher than those of developed countries; 
 Compared to developed countries, developing countries 
have more incidence of “tariff peaks,” with over one-
quarter of developing countries having more that 40% 
of tariffs at 15% or higher; 
 Developing countries’ tariffs in manufacture and 
agriculture are particularly harmful to developing 
countries’ economies and much welfare gains will be 
realized through their elimination. 
South African fruit exporters complain of non-tariff 
barriers to Chinese markets in the form of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, costly logistics, a lack of distribution 
channels within China, high import tariffs on fruits, cold chain 
sterilization requirements and registration of the orchards, and 
associated documentation.135 Barriers in developing countries’ 
 
 133. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 19. 
 134. ECON. ANALYTICAL UNIT, AUSTL. GOV’T, SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE: 
WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION, at ix, 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/south_south/south_south_trade.pdf 
[hereinafter WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION]. 
 135. Ron Sandrey et al., Non-tariff Measures Inhibiting South African 
Exports to China and India, in SOUTH AFRICA’S WAY AHEAD: LOOKING EAST 
209, 237–38 (2008), available at 
http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/ChinaIndiaBook2008_20090218
.pdf.  
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markets, especially tariff peaks and escalation in agriculture 
and manufacturing, are particularly damaging to Africa and 
undermine the continent’s plan to boost agricultural export and 
improve value-added manufacturing. Obstacles to developing 
countries’ markets in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical 
barriers to trade, are major problems that must be addressed if 
Africa is to benefit from new Africa-South cooperation 
frameworks. Countries in Africa are currently not part of the 
more robust regional trade arrangements. The IBSA forum 
involves only one country in Africa and its long-term 
development impact is yet to be seen.136 Whether the GSTP will 
achieve its full potential and become a viable instrument for 
increasing market access opportunities in developing countries 
also remains to be seen.137  
2. More Trade But Few Countries Benefitting  
Lack of diversity in terms of the countries in Africa that 
are actively participating in Africa-South trade is a cause for 
concern. Many countries are spectators in the unfolding Africa-
South cooperation framework. In 2008, for example, Egypt 
alone accounted for 51% of Africa’s export to Saudi Arabia, 
Angola alone accounted for 48% of Africa’s export to China, 
while South Africa alone accounted for 42% of the continent’s 
export to the Republic of Korea. Also in 2008, “the five largest 
African exporters to developing countries accounted for 67.5% 
[sic] of the region’s total exports while the top 10 accounted for 
89.2% [sic] [of the continent’s export].”138 Thus, in 2008: 
 Five countries (Angola, Sudan, South Africa, Congo, 
and Equatorial Guinea) accounted for 84% of the 
continent’s export to China.  
 Five countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Angola, 
and Morocco) accounted for 84% of the continent’s 
export to India. 
 Five countries (Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Morocco, and 
 
 136. See generally LAKSHMI PURI, IBSA: AN EMERGING TRINITY IN THE 
NEW GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (UNCTAD, Policy Issues in Int’l 
Trade & Commodities, Study Series No. 35, 2007) (discussing IBSA and its 
impact on trade). 
 137. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 20 (noting 
that “[w]ays need to be found to reinvigorate the GSTP.”). 
 138. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
33. 
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South Africa) accounted for 93% of the continent’s 
export to Brazil. 
 Five countries (Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, 
and Sudan) accounted for 85% of the continent’s trade 
export to Saudi Arabia. 
In short, only a few countries in Africa are actively 
participating in Africa-South trade as exporters. Many 
countries in Africa are not enjoying a robust trade relationship 
with those developing country trade partners that are 
considered important export destinations for Africa. Unless this 
trend is corrected, many countries in the continent risk being 
marginalized within the South-South economic framework. The 
countries at most risk are resource-poor LDCs in the continent. 
3. Increased Investment Cooperation Benefitting Few 
Countries 
African LDCs are also on the margins of the emerging 
investment geography. Africa-South FDI is concentrated by 
destination. Only a few countries attract the significant share 
of FDI inflow into Africa: Nigeria, Angola, Mauritius, Zambia, 
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. According to 
UNCTAD: 
 Although between 1991 and 2008 Africa saw an increase 
in mergers and acquisitions concluded by developing 
country TNCs, two countries (Egypt and South Africa) 
were most involved in Africa-South cross border M&A 
and accounted for 58% of M&A concluded by developing 
country TNCs. 
 Five countries (Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Tunisia, 
and Sudan) together accounted for 81% of cross-border 
M&A concluded by TNCs from developing countries 
from 1991 to 2008. 
 In 2005, approximately three quarters of Malaysia’s FDI 
went to just three countries – South Africa, Mauritius, 
and Sudan.139 
 FDI from Arab countries go principally to North African 
countries.  
In the area of infrastructure development, many countries 
in Africa are also losing out. An estimated 70% of Chinese 
infrastructure finance is going to only four countries: Nigeria, 
 
 139. Id. at 86. 
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Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan.140 Because Chinese 
infrastructure loans are frequently tied to natural resource 
development, countries that are naturally endowed are better 
positioned to attract the loans. Angola is the biggest recipient 
of Chinese infrastructure loans because of the presence of oil in 
the country; about half of Chinese oil import from Africa comes 
from Angola. 
4. Structural Development/Commodity Dependence 
The composition of Africa’s export to other developing 
countries is also a concern. Manufactured value-added products 
do not feature strongly in the composition of Africa’s export to 
developing countries. Rather, Africa’s export to developing 
countries is dominated by primary products (particularly fuel) 
and the trend appears to be worsening (Figures 3, 4, and 5).141 
In 1995, primary products accounted for a significant 55% of 
African export to other developing countries outside Africa. By 
2008, 75% of the continent’s export was composed of primary 
products.142 In 1995, 27% of Africa’s export consisted of 
resource-based manufactures, but the number fell to 15% in 
2008. A similar decline is recorded for the continent’s export in 
low, medium, and high technology manufactures which fell 
from 18% in 1995 to 10% in 2008.143 The same gloomy trend 
persists when the compositing of trade with the continent’s 
main developing country trade partners (e.g., China and India) 
is analyzed. Low, medium, and high technology manufactures 
account for a meager 3.1% and 3.9% of the continent’s export to 
China and India respectively. Simply put, “those developing 
countries to which Africa exports the most are those for whom 
low, medium and high technology manufactures represent the 
lowest shares.”144 These figures are troubling and dim any hope 
that South-South trade could be the key to Africa’s structural 
development. According to UNCTAD:  
 
 140. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at xiv. 
 141. Fuel (particularly oil) accounted for 67% of the continent’s export in 
2008, with oil accounting for 89% of the continent’s fuel export to non-African 
developing countries. 
 142. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
36. 
 143. In terms of sheer value, Africa has recorded an increase in the value of 
its low, medium and high technology manufacturing exports to other 
developing countries from $2.3 billion in 1995 to $12 billion in 2008. 
 144. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
38. 
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As a result of the changing composition of Africa’s exports to non-
African developing countries in the past decade however, there is now 
very little difference between the composition of Africa’s exports to 
developing and developed countries. . . . In both cases, primary 
products account for nearly three quarters of total exports while 
resource-based manufactures account for 12–15 per cent. Low, 
medium and high technology (other) manufactures make up a small 
part of exports to both groups, accounting for about 10 per cent of 
exports to developing countries and 14 per cent of exports to 
developed countries.145  
Commodity features strongly in Africa’s export to China. In 
2009, five products–mineral products, base metal, precious 
stones and metals, wood products, and textile and clothing– 
accounted for 91% of total African export to China. 
Furthermore, Africa exported mainly primary products with 
little or no value-added to China while China’s main export to 
Africa consisted of value-added manufacturing products 
including, machinery (6%), transport equipment (5%), textiles 
and clothing (3%), footwear (2%), and plastic products (2%). 
The problem is also evident in the foreign investment arena. An 
examination of the distribution of cross-border M&A in Africa 
concluded by TNCs from developing countries shows an 
overwhelming concentration in finance and natural resources: 
finance (33%), mining, quarrying, and petroleum (25%), 
transport, storage, and communications (25%), chemical and 
chemical products (6%), trade (4%), electricity, water, and gas 
(4%), and other secondary (8%). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
37–38. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 37. 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 38. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Source: Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, p. 39. 
The dominance of primary products in the continent’s 
export raises concerns about commodity dependence and 
attendant price volatility, suggests that efforts at addressing 
supply-side constraints to Africa’s export have not been 
effective, and points to the need for Southern partners to 
address barriers to African exports in their countries. The 
dominance of manufactures (particularly of consumer goods) in 
Africa’s import raises concerns about the interests of domestic 
industries given the influx of cheap products from other 
developing countries. 
5. Questioning Technology Development/Technology Transfer 
South-South economic cooperation provides opportunity for 
Africa to acquire needed technology from other developing 
countries on better terms than has been the case in the context 
of North-South Trade. However, it is difficult to determine if 
effective and appropriate technology transfer is occurring and 
on what terms. In the context of Africa-China trade and 
investment, research reveals that technology transfer is not 
occurring as much as is claimed in official documents of 
FOCAC. Few Chinese firms operating in Africa have the 
capability to innovate and themselves face frequent charges of 
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intellectual property theft from companies in the West.146 The 
focus of Chinese firms investing in Africa is not in the sectors 
where rapid technology transfer is common.147 The distribution 
of cross-border M&A in Africa by developing countries shows 
concentration in Mining, Quarrying, and Petroleum (27%), 
Finance (28%), Transport, Storage, and Communication (22%), 
Chemicals and Chemical Products (6%), Electricity, Gas, and 
Water (4%), and Trade (4%). 
6. Sustainability of Domestic Industry 
With 56% of Africa’s import coming from other developing 
countries in 2008 and consisting primarily of low, medium, and 
high manufactures, concerns about infant industries in the 
continent necessarily arise.148 Even more worrying is the fact 
that this trend is worsening. In 2000, manufactures made up 
only 47% of Africa’s import from other developing countries 
compared to 58% in 2008. In the context of China-Africa trade, 
the influx of cheap textiles is threatening domestic industries 
in Africa and undermining the continent’s export potential. The 
influx of cheap Chinese textiles has reportedly resulted in the 
shutdown of prominent Ghanaian textile firms like Ghana 
Textile Print (GTP) and Printex. In Nigeria, the number of 
Textile Manufacturing Association employees reportedly 
dropped from 250,000 in 1996, to less than 30,000 in 2004 due 
to influx of cheaper Chinese textiles. Popular textile companies 
like Kaduna Textile Mill have shut down as a result.  
7. Africa, Emerging Economies, and Global Governance 
Architecture  
It is increasingly accepted that large emerging countries 
like China and India will reshape the current quasi-unilateral 
world. However, it is not clear that the new multipolar world 
will be less hostile to poor countries and countries on the 
margin. It is also not clear that emerging economies will be 
willing to fundamentally transform the global economic system 
in ways that will benefit Africa. As countries like the US seek 
to integrate emerging powers into international institutions, 
 
 146. Wong & Chan, supra note 102, at 296. 
 147. Id. at 285. See also Mark Wang, The Motivations Behind China’s 
Government-Initiated Industrial Investments Overseas, 75 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 
187 (2002).  
 148. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
39. 
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will these countries be willing and able to challenge and 
transform the inherited geopolitical and economic landscape of 
the post-World War II liberal order?  
In the BIT sphere, there is at present no evidence that 
emerging economies are seeking or attempting to transform the 
post-World War II international regime for the governance of 
foreign investment. What is emerging is not a new system of 
global investment rules and norms that balance the interests of 
investors against those of host nations. As the new exporters of 
capital, countries such as China and India are concluding BITs 
with other developing countries on the same terms and 
conditions as those concluded by Western countries. This 
author’s textual examination of China-Africa BITs yielded very 
little difference between China-Africa BITs and BITs between 
Africa and other Western countries (see Annex 1). Berger 
concludes that in its BITs, “China has agreed to international 
standards of the legal protection of FDI and thus to the current 
liberal global governance regime for FDI.”149 According to 
Berger, the Chinese government has adopted “a complimentary 
rather than a competitive approach in the field of global FDI 
governance” and “is not overthrowing the existing order of FDI 
governance but has rather become part of it.”150  
In sum, faced with Western powers intent on socializing 
them into existing international institutions and safeguarding 
the Western liberal order, rivalries and competition among 
themselves, and their own domestic problems, emerging powers 
may not have the willingness or the capacity to champion the 
causes of poorer nations, may become selective in their South-
South cooperation agenda, and may seek to first advance their 
respective national interests. The April 2010 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)151 between the United States and the 
Government of Brazil establishing a fund for technical 
assistance and capacity building related to the cotton sector in 
Brazil is a case in point. Accepting compensation from the US 
as a solution to the “cotton dispute” may be in Brazil’s national 
 
 149. AXEL BERGER, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE EMERGING LIBERAL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY APPROACH 22 (German Development Institute ed., 2008).  
 150. Id. at 26. 
 151. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil 
Agree on Memorandum of Understanding As Part of Path Forward Towards 
Resolution of Cotton Dispute (Apr. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-memorandum-understanding-
part-path-f. 
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interest but is not in the interest of African farmers whose 
livelihood are damaged by US subsidies.  
8. Obstacles and Barriers to South-South Trade 
Obstacles to developing countries’ markets in the form of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade are a 
major problem that must be addressed if Africa is to benefit 
from Africa-South cooperation. One report found that:  
 Average applied tariff of developing countries are above 
developed country rates, despite liberalization attempts 
in the past decade; 
 Approximately 70% of tariffs that developing country 
exporters face are applied by other developing 
countries;  
 Developing country service trade barriers are also 
significantly higher than those of developed countries; 
 Compared to developed countries, developing countries 
have more incidence of tariff peaks, with over one-
quarter of developing countries having more that 40% 
of tariffs at 15 % or higher; 
 Developing countries’ tariffs in manufacture and 
agriculture are particularly harmful to developing 
countries’ economies and much welfare gains will be 
realized through their elimination.152 
Barriers in developing countries’ markets, particularly 
tariff peaks and escalation in agriculture and manufacturing, 
are particularly damaging to Africa and undermine the 
continent’s plans to boost agricultural export and improve 
manufacturing value-added. Clearly, asymmetries in the 
economic relations between Africa and key Southern partners 
are a major concern. Non-traditional barriers to trade impede 
Africa’s export and erode any benefit the continent might have 
gained from available preferential access schemes. 
9. Weak Institutional Framework  
At present Africa-South arrangements lack strong 
institutional frameworks. Much is promised and little delivered 
in part because of the absence of an effective monitoring 
mechanism. Urgently needed are necessary institutional 
frameworks that can: (i) facilitate broad-based strategic 
 
 152. WINNING FROM LIBERALISATION, supra note 134, at ix. 
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dialogues involving governments and the private sector; (ii) 
monitor the implementation of commitments; (iii) identify and 
raise awareness about trade and investment opportunities in 
Africa and developing partner countries; and (iv) identify 
problems when they arise. At present, only a few bilateral 
arrangements involving Africa have formal dialogue platforms: 
China-Africa (2000), India-Africa (2008), Korea-Africa (2006), 
and Turkey-Africa (2008). Most other bilateral arrangements 
lack any formal dialogue platform raising questions about their 
long term survivability (See Table 1, pp. 35).153 In the context of 
China-Africa relations, FOCAC provides the necessary 
institutional framework. Monitoring of commitment is carried 
out through multi-level FOCAC meetings. However, while 
FOCAC has its office in China, it has no presence in Africa. 
Moreover, there are no annual or progress reports from 
FOCAC, no mechanism for filing complaints or resolving 
conflicts, and no meaningful process for stakeholder 
engagement. In recent years, China has made efforts to involve 
the private sector in FOCAC processes.  
Africa-South America Cooperative Forum of State and 
Government (ASACOF) was established in 2006 pursuant to 
the Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative 
Forum. As envisaged, ASACOF shall meet every two years, 
alternating between the two regions. In the 2006 resolution, 
the two sides also resolved to “[c]ontinously monitor the 
effective implementation of the Plan of Action for maximum 
benefit” and “[s]et up appropriate institutions and mechanisms 
to give practical expression to the Cooperative Forum.”154 The 
First Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of the ASA was held at 
the Itamaraty Palace, Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia, 
Brazil, on June 10–11 2008. One of the objectives of the 
meeting was to refine the structure and follow-up mechanisms 
of ASA/ASACOF. In the same vein, the institutional framework 
of the India-Africa Forum is still being worked out. In 
Paragraph 20 of the Delhi Declaration adopted in 2008 
following the India-Africa Forum Summit, the two sides agreed 
that in addition to high level political exchanges between them 
in the bilateral, regional, and multilateral contexts, Africa and 
 
 153. For example, arrangements between Africa and the following 
countries have no formal platform for dialogue: Brazil, Cuba, U.A.E., 
Venezuela, Malaysia, Kuwait, Singapore, Thailand, and Bolivia. 
 154. Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative Forum, supra 
note 79, paras. 8–9.  
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India must meet every three years.155 The next summit is 
planned for 2011 in Africa.156 
The long-term prospects and credibility of Africa-South 
engagements may depend on the establishment of credible 
institutions and the ability of the institutions, once created, to 
command the respect of respective governments and 
stakeholders. 
10. Dispute Settlement 
Related to institutional building is the absence of 
established mechanisms for the settlement of disputes that 
may arise now or in the future. It is not clear how grievances 
and disputes are or will be resolved under the new 
arrangements. Will South-South partners favor a power-based 
system of dispute settlement over a rule-based system? In the 
context of China-Africa arrangements, friendly consultation is 
presently favored. Exactly what “friendly consultation” means 
or encompasses is not clear. In the Declaration of the Beijing 
Summit 2006, for example, both sides agreed to “[p]roperly 
handle issues and challenges that may arise in the course of 
cooperation through friendly consultation in keeping with 
China-Africa friendship and the long-term interests of the two 
sides.”157 Also in the Beijing Platform for Action, the two sides 
agreed to “[p]roperly address, in a spirit of mutual 
understanding and accommodation, trade disputes and 
frictions through bilateral or multilateral friendly 
consultations.”158 Finally, in the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan, 
the two sides agreed “to properly handle trade differences and 
frictions through friendly consultation under the principle of 
mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.”159 
Disputes will necessarily arise and designing appropriate and 
effective dispute settlement procedures is an issue that must be 
addressed in the context of South-South economic cooperation. 
In this regard, developing countries will one day have to 
address some of the thorny issues that presently plague the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
 155.  Delhi Declaration, supra note 113. 
 156.  Id. para. 20. 
 157. Declaration of the Beijing Summit, supra note 86. 
 158. Beijing Action Plan, supra note 88, para. 3.3. 
 159. Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan, supra note 127, para. 4.4.7. “The two 
sides agreed to encourage the usage of national and regional arbitration 
organs in resolving contractual conflicts between Chinese and African 
enterprises.” Id. at para. 4.4.8. 
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11. The Cost of Overlapping South-South Negotiations and 
Partnerships 
For poor countries in Africa, the emergence of new 
initiatives and structures for cooperation comes at a significant 
cost. African LDCs must worry about the financial and human 
cost of participating in multiple fora including the WTO, 
regional and sub-regional institutions, as well as growing 
bilateral processes. The bilateral processes may prove much 
more burdensome because each partner has its own framework 
for cooperation. Concurrent participation in the Doha Round 
negotiations and the GSTP negotiations may be too expensive 
and overwhelming for many countries in Africa (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
 
Bilateral 
Cooperation 
Organizational 
Structure 
Frequency of 
Meetings  
Forum on 
China-Africa 
Cooperation 
Follow-up Committee 
of FOCAC/Ministerial 
conferences 
Every three 
years: 2000, 
2003, 2006, and 
2009 
India-Africa 
Forum Summit 
No organizational 
structure/ Heads of 
State Summit 
Every three 
years: 2008  
Korea-Africa 
Economic 
Cooperation 
KOAFEC Secretariat/ 
KOAFEC Consultative 
Group/ KOAFEC 
Ministerial 
Conference 
Every two years: 
2006, 2008, and 
2010 
Turkey-Africa 
Co-operation 
Summit 
No organizational 
structure/ Heads of 
State Summit 
Every five years: 
2008 
 
UNCTAD has suggested that Southern partners “consider 
streamlining and aligning their initiatives to reduce the 
transactions costs to Africa and maximize their benefits.” 
However, it is doubtful that the suggestion to streamline 
initiatives will be considered in the foreseeable future.160 
 
 
 160. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
27. 
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C. THE UGLY: THE DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF SOUTH-SOUTH 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION  
1. Resource for Infrastructure Deals: Another Debt Trap?  
In 2006, China pledged US$3 billion in preferential loans 
and US$2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa. In 
2009, following the 4th FOCAC Ministerial Conference, Beijing 
pledged to provide US$10 billion in concessional loans to 
African countries and to support Chinese financial institutions 
by setting up a US$1 billion special loan for small and medium-
sized African businesses. China-Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank 
provides the bulk (about 92%) of the resources for Chinese 
infrastructure development in Africa.161 “Resources for 
infrastructure” or “Angola mode” is China Ex-Im Bank’s 
preferred mode for doing business with countries in Africa with 
abundant resources and limited creditworthiness. Under this 
deal structure, African governments use natural resources to 
repay loans received for infrastructure development. The 
Angola mode allows the Chinese government to “gain physical 
security over oil resources” and allows beneficiary governments 
to obtain needed finance. To date, about eight deals totaling 
more than US$3 billion have been reported, including a 2007 
deal with Ghana worth US$562 million involving cocoa, a 2005 
deal with Nigeria worth US$298 million involving oil, and a 
US$1 billion deal with Guinea and involving Bauxite. Although 
natural resource-based transactions in the oil industry are not 
unique or novel, they raise new concerns today for several 
reasons including the lack of transparency surrounding the 
loan negotiations,162 the lack of conditionality attached to the 
loans, and the danger of unsustainable loans.  
Is Beijing’s offer of cheap loans to African governments 
reversing gains in the effort to address unsustainable debts in 
the continent? “If countries are borrowing to the extent that 
their debt becomes unsustainable then that undermines all the 
work that has been done in trying to tackle unsustainable 
debt,” Hilary Benn, then Britain’s International Development 
 
 161. Additional funds comes from Chinese government (3%), State owned 
enterprises (5%) and the China-Africa Development Fund (0.3%). See 
BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at 53. 
 162. Id. at 55 (noting that “[r]elatively little is known about the terms of 
the China Ex-Im Bank’s concessional loans.”). Being a state policy bank, 
details of the activities of China’s Ex-Im Bank are not available and cannot be 
scrutinized by stakeholders in Africa.  
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Secretary, told reporters.163 Guinea, for example, has 
contracted Chinese debts in excess of the value of debt relief by 
the OECD, receiving about US$870 million in debt relief and 
accepting concessional loans from China to the tune of US$1 
billion.164 Also, Nigeria has received about US$10.022 billion in 
debt relief and has accepted Chinese infrastructure finance to 
the tune of US$5.398 billion. However, Foster, Butterfield, 
Chen, and Pushak conclude that “some of the largest 
beneficiaries of Chinese finance . . . have not been beneficiaries 
of recent debt relief initiatives,” and that “[t]here are only a 
handful of countries where the value of recent loans contracted 
to China represents a high share of the value of recent OECD 
debt relief.”165  
2. Human Rights/Labor Rights Concerns.  
Human rights as a concept do not feature strongly in 
South-South discourse and framework documents. Beijing’s 
emphasis on respect for the sovereignty of African countries is 
commendable but can be and is being used as a pretext for 
ignoring serious human rights abuses in the continent and 
dealing with Africa’s most brutal and corrupt leaders. Whether 
China is safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of 
African peoples or just the interest of corrupt leaders in the 
continent is a question that increasingly must be asked. 
Admittedly China is gradually moving away from its non-
interference stance.166 In his speech at the 4th Ministerial 
Conference, the Chinese Premier expressed China’s willingness 
to “increase involvement in the settlement of issues concerning 
peace and security in Africa” but also reaffirmed China’s non-
interference stance: 
 
 
 163. JOHN HUMPHREY, RESEARCH IN EUROPE AND AFRICA-CHINA 
RELATIONSHIPS: A REPORT FOR THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION 2 (2007), 
available at http://asiandrivers.open.ac.uk/documents/china_africa_research.p
df. 
 164. BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 120, at 64. 
 165. Id. at 65. 
 166. The Chinese government has appointed a special representative for 
African affairs. Since 2006, China has sent a total of 6,281 peacekeeping 
personnel and policemen to Africa, including 1,629 who are serving in six UN 
peacekeeping missions. China has also dispatched four naval fleets to the 
waters off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden for escorting missions. 
Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t627504.htm. 
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The Chinese government and people respect the right of African 
countries to independently choose their social systems and support 
the African people in exploring development paths that suit their 
national conditions. We firmly believe that Africa is fully capable of 
solving its own problems in an African way. The economic cooperation 
and trade between China and Africa are based on mutual benefit, 
win-win progress, openness and transparency. China has never 
attached any political strings to its support and assistance to Africa, 
and nor will it do so in the future.167 
Ignoring the human rights record of African leaders 
arguably contradicts the development objectives of South-South 
partnership and makes it harder for regulatory institutions and 
civil society organizations in Africa to question the human 
rights record of the increasing number of emerging 
multinational corporations operating in the continent. In the 
future, alliances between civil society organizations based in 
the South will be needed to complement growing South-South 
trade and investment. Although international human rights 
and development organizations such as Human Rights Watch 
and Oxfam will remain relevant in Africa for the foreseeable 
future, partnerships between African-based human rights 
organizations and similar organizations based in countries such 
as India, China, Brazil, and South Korea will be needed to 
ensure that human rights is more fully integrated into South-
South cooperation discourse and that the activities of emerging 
multinationals and other private actors are constantly on the 
radar.  
3. Environmental Concerns  
Africa-South economic cooperation is orchestrating new 
activities in the extractive industry, spurring never before seen 
infrastructure development, and may also spur 
industrialization in the continent in the near future. China has 
become a major player in the development of hydropower in 
Africa and its investments are generally concentrated in 
environmentally sensitive sectors. These developments raise 
serious questions about the environmental consequences of 
Africa-South cooperation. Environmental concerns in the 
context of Africa-South cooperation are heightened by the fact 
that many of the activities in the extractive industry and the 
construction sector involve hitherto unknown corporations – 
companies that are typically not on the radar of international 
environmental groups and have yet to develop credible 
 
 167. Jiabao, supra note 81. 
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environmental policies. In the case of China, activities carried 
out by state-owned enterprises raise additional questions about 
transparency, liability, and sovereign immunity in the event of 
lawsuits. Troubling projects of the past decade include:  
 the Belinga mine project in Gabon, a US$3.5 billion dam 
construction project involving a Chinese company 
which threatened the destruction of the Kongou Fall in 
the Invindo National Park; 
 the Merowe Dam in Sudan, a US$519 million project 
approved by the China Ex-IM Bank and credited for 
displacing more than 50,000 Sudanese from the Nile 
Valley into desert locations; 
 the Gibe 3 Dam in Ethiopia, a US$1.75 billion project by 
Italian hydropower developer Salini Costruttori backed 
by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
and mainland power equipment supplier Dongfang 
Electric Corporation. The dam threatens the livelihood 
of 500,000 indigenous, according to environmental 
groups; and  
 the Bui Dam project in Ghana involving Sinohydro and 
financed by China Ex-Im Bank (the dam threatens the 
Bui National Park in Ghana). 
What are the duties and responsibilities of construction 
companies, energy companies, and infrastructure financiers 
from other developing countries operating in Africa? In the 
event of massive human rights and environmental damage 
what might be the legal liability of these actors?  
In the future, it will be important to monitor the 
environmental policies of Southern partners and Southern 
corporations operating in Africa. In the last decade China 
created a Ministry of Environmental Protection, strengthened 
environmental regulations, and adopted a green credit policy. 
China is also a leading promoter of renewable energy 
possibilities. Whether these changes translate into good 
environmental practices abroad, particularly in Africa, is hard 
to tell. It will be up to African civil society groups in 
partnership with civil society groups in other developing 
countries and international NGOs to pressure new actors in 
Africa to adopt credible and effective environmental policies. In 
2004, under pressure from international environmental groups, 
China Ex-Im Bank adopted an environmental policy, and in 
2008, adopted more detailed guidelines. In 2008, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) adopted the 
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international environmental principle known as the Equator 
Principles. China Ex-Im Bank has reportedly signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the World Bank to share 
information on project evaluation procedures.168 On January 4, 
2008, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) publicly issued CSR 
Guideline for State-Owned Enterprises.169 Again, whether 
these reforms meet with international standards is a question 
that must be asked, and whether they will be implemented 
remains to be seen. 
4. African LDCs and South-South Arrangements  
Although declarations and resolutions of the G-77 
acknowledge the situation of LDCs and call for sensitivity 
towards the LDCs, there is yet to emerge a concrete program or 
consensus on how to address the structural, economic, and 
social constraints these countries face, which make it difficult 
for them to take advantage of opportunities in South-South 
trade. The Caracas Programme of Action called for “special 
attention should be paid to countries in greater need, 
particularly the Least Developed Countries, so that they can 
effectively participate and benefit from programmes of 
economic cooperation among developing countries in all fields 
of such cooperation.”170 According to the GSTP Declaration, 
“[t]he special needs of the least developed countries should be 
clearly recognized and concrete preferential measures in favour 
of these countries should be agreed upon; the least developed 
countries will not be required to make concessions on a 
reciprocal basis.”171 In the São Paulo Declaration, G-77 
members pledged to “work towards developing concrete 
preferential measures to be accorded in favour of least-
developed country participants.”172 Despite the declarations 
 
 168. Ethiopia Dam Blot on China’s Aid Record, E. AFR. FORUM: NEWS 
FROM THE HORN OF AFR. (June 8, 2010), http://www.eastafricaforum.net/2010/
06/08/ethiopia-dam-blot-on-chinas-aid-record/. 
 169. See generally Peter Bosshard, China’s Environmental Footprint in 
Africa, SAAIA CHINA IN AFR. POLICY BRIEFING, at 6 (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/SAIIA%20policy%20briefing%20508.p
df. 
 170. Caracas Programme of Action 1981, supra note 45, 
 171. Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries 
[GSTP], Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences Among 
Developing Countries, at 4 (Apr. 12, 1988), 
http://www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/LegalInstruments/gstp_en.pdf. 
 172. GSTP, São Paulo Declaration on the Launching of the Third Round of 
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and affirmations, many questions are yet to be resolved in the 
context of South-South economic cooperation. Will special and 
differential treatment (SDT) and aid for trade (AfT) feature in 
South-South trade and to what degree? What kind of market 
access concessions will Southern partners offer LDCs? Will 
preference schemes become a strong component of South-South 
trade discourse? 
5. Secrecy/Lack of Transparency 
There is still a lot that ordinary citizens do not know about 
Africa-South trade. Contracts involving millions of dollars and 
vast amounts of natural resources are concluded without public 
debate or discussion. Contracts are awarded through secret 
bidding processing that many believe to be rigged. The result is 
that many in Africa do not understand the scope and potential 
implication of growing Africa-South trade and do not embrace 
the unfolding arrangements. China’s trade and investment 
agenda in Africa is still not fully known or understood by 
ordinary Africans.173 In part because of China’s state-centric 
approach to African diplomacy, much secrecy surrounds 
China’s day to day activities in the region from negotiations for 
important contracts to their eventual execution. Secrecy is 
especially damaging in the South-South context because 
presently most of the activities implicate natural resources 
where human rights and environmental pollution are rife and 
where long-term development goals could be compromised with 
a stroke of the pen. Negotiations regarding Gabon’s Belinga 
mine project, a US$3.5 billion project that was designed to 
include a mine, a dam, railroads, and a port facility, were 
carried out in complete secrecy. Although the dam potentially 
affected whole communities and threatened the lives of 
thousands, those who would be affected were largely unaware 
of the negotiations and were neither consulted nor informed 
about the project. Gabonese activists that raised concerns about 
the proposed project were harassed and jailed. Moreover, under 
 
Negotiations Within the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing 
Countries, ¶ 4, GSTP/C.P./SSB/5 (July 23, 2004), http://www.unctadxi.org/Secu
red/GSTP/Declarations/spd_en.pdf. 
 173. See generally Frequently Asked Questions about Corruption, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L: GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION, 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Feb. 
18, 2011) (defining “transparency” as “a principle that allows those affected by 
administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not 
only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes.”).  
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the terms of a leaked copy of the Belinga mine project 
agreement, Gabon was to receive only 10% of the mining profit 
while the Chinese company involved in the project was granted 
a 25-year tax break. Not only are the African populace and civil 
society groups not informed of on-going negotiations, 
information regarding Chinese operations in Africa is also 
generally very difficult to access—an issue clearly complicated 
by the involvement of state owned enterprises.  
6. Asymmetries of the New Geography of Trade and Investment 
Asymmetries in Africa-South trade raise serious concerns 
as well and suggest that, for many countries, South-South 
trade may not be any different from Africa-North trade. In this 
regard, both the content and terms of Africa-South trade are a 
concern. Although Africa’s trade with developing countries has 
increased and the continent’s trade with developed countries is 
decreasing, the continent “has a trade surplus with developing 
countries but a surplus with developed countries.”174 Simply 
put, Africa is importing more from other developing countries 
than the continent is exporting to them. Thus, while countries 
such as Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, and Turkey are 
increasingly depending on Africa as a market for their export, 
Africa is not depending on these countries as a market for its 
export to the same extent. In 2008, 12% of Syria’s export went 
to Africa while only 6.8% of its import came from Africa. The 
same is true for Lebanon and Turkey; 15.36% of Lebanon’s 
export went to Africa and only 4.34% of the country’s import 
came from Africa. In 2008, 6.87% of Turkey’s export went to 
Africa, while only 3.85% of Africa’s export goes to Turkey. 
Africa’s trade deficit with other developing countries is 
therefore a major concern. Also worrying is the fact that 
Southern partners are primarily interested in Africa’s natural 
resources. In 2008, 84% of Africa’s export to China was 
comprised of primary products while only 16% was comprised 
of manufactures; of the manufactures, only 3.1% are low, 
medium, and high technology manufactures. On the other 
hand, during the same period, the share of low, medium and 
high technology manufactures in Africa’s import from China 
stood at 86% (up from 76% in 2000).175 
Thus, although China typically views evolving relations 
 
 174. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
30. 
 175. Id. at 39.  
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with Africa through a North-South, post-colonial prism, African 
nations should not be seduced into believing that the China-
Africa arrangement will be automatically beneficial and 
produce win-win outcomes for all. In a speech at the 4th 
Ministerial Conference in 2009, the Chinese Premier stated: 
Our relationship is based on mutual support . . . It is guided by the 
core principle of mutual respect and equality. It is driven by our joint 
endeavor to pursue mutually-beneficial cooperation and common 
development . . . We are all developing countries and face both rare 
historic opportunities for faster development and complex global 
challenges. We should enhance mutually beneficial 
cooperation . . . Cooperation between us will catalyze South-South 
cooperation and enhance the collective standing of developing 
countries in the international political and economic architecture. 
Cooperation between us will promote democracy in international 
relations and justice in the international order . . . .176  
7. The Absence of Ground Rules on Some Fundamental Issues: 
New Rules for a New Trade and Investment Geography 
The new geography of trade and investment forces a 
rethinking on the role of law in economic relations and the legal 
gaps in existing South-South arrangements. For example, what 
is the role and responsibility of EMNCs operating in Africa? Is 
there room for special and differential treatment in South-
South arrangement? What will be the mechanism for dispute 
settlement in the South-South context? Will trade-related 
technical assistance feature in South-South trade 
arrangements?177 Overall, will developing countries simply 
adapt existing norms and practices or will they create new ones 
better suited to their economic situations and development 
aspirations?  
On the investment front, developing countries appear to 
have simply embraced existing norms and modalities relating 
to the governance and protection of foreign investments. There 
are few discernible differences between the content of South-
 
 176. Jiabao, supra note 81. 
 177. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, 
at 42. UNCTAD suggests that Southern partners “could . . . play a direct role 
in boosting Africa’s capacity to export manufactures by contributing to the Aid 
for Trade Initiative as well as by making technology transfer an important 
component of their technology assistance to the region.” Id. UNCTAD suggests 
that Southern partners “could . . . play a direct role in boosting Africa’s 
capacity to export manufactures by contributing to the Aid for Trade Initiative 
as well as by making technology transfer an important component of their 
technology assistance to the region.” Id.  
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South BITs and those of North-South BITs. For example, 
features of China-Africa BITs include: broad asset-based 
definition of investment, absolute standards of treatment (e.g., 
fair and equitable treatment), relative standards of treatment 
(e.g., national treatment and most-favored nations), protection 
against expropriation, protection against wars, riots, and 
related civil disturbances, transfer of funds provision, and most 
importantly, extensive investor-State dispute settlement 
provision. 
8. Labor Rights Concerns 
Labor rights issues arise on two fronts. First, will South-
South economic cooperation boost employment opportunities in 
Africa, and to what degree? Second, what are the labor rights 
implications of the activities of corporations from other 
developing countries in sectors such as the extractive industry 
or the construction industry? Regarding the later, new foreign 
employers are appearing on the scene in Africa. Unfortunately, 
many countries in the continent lack the capacity to effectively 
assess the employment and labor law implications of Africa-
South arrangements. Anecdotal evidence suggests that labor 
rights violations are occurring. A baseline study by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) of labor practices on 
construction sites in the United Republic of Tanzania, involving 
eleven large construction projects, found that three of the four 
projects that were found to have exceptionally low labor 
standards, with long working hours, low pay, low standard of 
occupational safety and health (OSH), and a poor record on 
workers’ rights, were operated by Chinese contractors.178 The 
study, according to the authors, suggests that the success 
Chinese contractors are having in winning an increasing 
number of tenders in Tanzania “may . . . be at the expense of 
the labour force.”179 
Labor practices of Southern partners must be continually 
probed. The issue is important and complicated in Africa 
 
 178. See International Labour Organization National Construction Council, 
Baseline Study of Labour Practices on large construction sites in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, at 84–85, Sectoral Activites Program, Working Paper 
225 (2005) (noting the nationalities of the main contractors that were part of 
the study as Chinese (4), Japanese (2), South African (1), Kuwaiti (1), Danish 
(1) and Indian (1)). The study found that three projects—two with South 
Africa contractors and one with Norwegian contractor—had consistently high 
standards. Id.  
 179.  See id. 
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because sectors such as construction, mining, and oil and gas 
that are found to be the most corruption-prone are also the 
sectors that have attracted EMNCs the most. Transparency 
International’s 2008 Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) ranked the 
BRIC countries and Mexico at the bottom on a list of 22 leading 
international and regional exporting countries measured by the 
tendency of their firms to bribe abroad.180 At the very bottom 
was Russia with a score of 5.9, followed by China (6.5), Mexico 
(6.6), India (6.8) and Brazil (7.4). Brazil has ratified the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, but Russia, India, and China have 
not. 
9. State-Centered Development Model/Lack of Broad 
Stakeholder Involvement 
South-South discussions and dialogue occur primarily at 
the ministerial level and frequently ignore important 
constituencies in the private sector and civil society. China’s 
bilateral, state-centric approach to diplomacy in Africa 
privileges the political elite in the continent at the same time 
that it sidelines important non-state actors as well as sub-
regional and regional organizations in Africa. At present, 
unfolding bilateral arrangements are driven primarily by the 
respective governments and not by the private sector. This 
creates two problems. First, it appears to encourage, in Africa, 
a development path that ignores private domestic 
constituencies and interest groups. Second, it makes it difficult 
to assess the extent to which Chinese involvement in the region 
addresses the needs of ordinary Africans. Thus far, Beijing has 
been creative in meeting “elite-defined needs” in the continent. 
The private sector must be involved for South-South 
economic cooperation to work. In response to criticism, Beijing 
is now making more of an effort to involve the private sector in 
FOCAC activities. The last decade witnessed the establishment 
of the China-Africa Chamber of Industry and Commerce in 
2006, the convening of the High-level Dialogue between 
Chinese and African Leaders and Business Representatives in 
2006, the establishment of a China-Africa Development Fund 
(Cadfund) in 2007, and the first, second, and third Conference 
of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs.181 At the 2006 meeting 
 
 180. Bribe Players Index 2008, TRANSPARENCY INT’L: THE GLOBAL 
COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/bpi_2008. 
 181. The first conference was held in 2003; the second conference was in 
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of the Chinese and African business communities, Premier Wen 
Jiabao pledged that the Chinese Government “will continue to 
facilitate the exchanges and cooperation between the Chinese 
and African business communities.”182 Following the 3rd 
Conference in 2009, China pledged, in the next three years, to 
support Chinese enterprises to set up three to five full-service 
logistic centers in Africa. Jointly founded in 2004 by the China 
Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, the United 
Nations Development Programme, and the Ministry of 
Commerce/China International Center for Economic & 
Technical Exchanges, the China-Africa Business Council now 
provides practical business tools to facilitate the strengthening 
of business ties between China and Africa.183  
In conclusion, judged by available information, Africa-
South trade will not necessarily and automatically produce 
benefits to Africa. Among nations and within nations in Africa, 
there will be winners and losers. Presently, trade and 
investment from China is concentrated in a few countries and 
in a few sectors. On the winning side are resource-rich and 
politically strategic countries in the region such as Nigeria, 
Angola and even Sudan. On the losing side will be resource-
poor, marginal countries in the continent. Is UNCTAD correct 
in its assertion that Southern partners “have a responsibility to 
ensure that the relationship with Africa yields maximum 
benefits to both sides?”184 Asserting such a responsibility is 
easy; more difficult and complicated is devising how to 
 
2006 in Beijing; the third conference was in November 2009 in Egypt. See 
Chinese, African Entrepreneurs Gather in Egypt to Push Economic Co-op, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Nov. 8, 2009), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/9000
1/90776/90883/6806802.html. Following the second conference, 16 cooperative 
agreements were reportedly signed between 12 Chinese enterprises and 
African governments and firms, worth of nearly $1.9 billion in total. Id. About 
500 Chinese and African entrepreneurs reportedly attended the third 
conference. Id. At the conclusion of the conference, contracts of 16 cooperation 
projects were signed, and letters of intention for cooperation in 15 projects 
were also inked, to the tune of $500 million. Id. 
 182. Wen Jiabao, Premier St. Council China, Address at the Opening 
Ceremony of the High-level Dialogue Between Chinese and African Leaders 
and Business Representatives And the Second Conference of Chinese and 
African Entrepreneurs: Strengthen China Africa Cooperation for Mutual 
Benefit (Nov. 4, 2006), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/SP32009/t60755
2.htm. 
 183. See Brief Introduction to China-Africa Business Council, CHINA-AFR. 
BUS. COUNCIL, http://www.cabc.org.cn/english/introduce.asp. 
 184. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT 2010, supra note 73, at 
26–27. 
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encourage and or compel Southern partners, particularly the 
advanced developing countries, to operate fairly and 
responsibly given the new trade and investment geography. 
The long-term dividend to Africa of Africa-South engagement is 
yet to be assessed. Thus, while Chinese firms are getting into 
Africa, it is not clear on what terms and to whose benefits they 
operate. According to Wong and Chan, Chinese firms that 
venture overseas “are typically small” and “are usually unable 
to share capital, technology, market information, or production 
resources.”185 They also note that “[o]nly one-third of oversea 
investments are profitable, with only one-third barely servicing 
and the rest in the red or even being wound up.”186 This is bad 
news in a continent looking to FDI to spur its manufacturing 
sector. 
VI. AFRICA-SOUTH TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
COOPERATION: THE NEXT STEPS 
Even if the idea of a new trade geography is accepted, 
countries in Africa will not automatically benefit under the new 
geography and are presently not moving any closer to the 
centre of international or regional economic relations. 
Undoubtedly, there are immense opportunities in Africa-South 
trade for countries in Africa to boost export, access 
development finance, and gain better integration into the 
multilateral economic system. However, Africa risks 
marginalization in the South-South framework unless 
asymmetries between Africa and key Southern partners are 
immediately addressed. Factors that have furthered Africa’s 
marginalization in the globalization process such as weak 
policy framework and institutions, protection at home and 
abroad, dependence on few primary products, deep-seated 
structural problems, and imbalances must also be addressed as 
a matter of urgency. Unless attention is paid to the foundations 
of emerging Africa-South arrangements, the continent may find 
itself further marginalized even in the new trade and 
investment geography.187  
 
 185. Wong & Chang, supra note 102, at 278. 
 186. See id. at 278. See also Goh Sui Noi, China Firms Spread Wings but 
Many Fail to Take Off, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002.  
 187. See New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 1 
(noting that the share of the South in global trade and financial flows has 
grown dramatically but that “[n]ot all countries in South have been able to 
take part in this journey.”). 
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Whether the journey on the South-South train will be 
smooth, rapid, and beneficial for peoples and countries in Africa 
will depend on African countries themselves, other Southern 
partners, and the international community. African countries 
have the primary responsibility for promoting and 
implementing South-South trade and investment cooperation. 
It is, however, important that the international community 
support the continent’s effort to expand South-South 
cooperation. In Resolution 58/220, the UN General Assembly 
recognized “the urgent need to help to strengthen the capacities 
of the developing countries, especially the least developed 
countries, to participate in and benefit from globalization and 
liberalization processes.”188 In the Accra Accord of UNCTAD 
XII, Heads of State and Government noted that “[t]he new 
opportunities for trade, investment and economic cooperation 
among developing countries need to be fully exploited, and this 
tendency should be encouraged and benefits extended to all 
regions.”189 
A. AFRICA  
African countries must urgently seek ways to strategically 
integrate South-South trade, investment, and economic 
cooperation into their respective development plans and must 
proactively respond to the opportunities emerging in South-
South trade. Not only must the continent expand the direction 
of its trade, but it must also expand the content of its export. 
African leaders, with active participation from the private 
sector, must find solutions to the continent’s minimal share of 
global trade, weak technology base that prevent manufacturing 
value-added in the continent, and unhealthy dependence on 
commodities. As the President of Tanzania rightly noted: 
Africa is not only the greatest loser in a globalising world~ it is also 
structurally and institutionally positioned to continue being the 
greatest loser unless African leaders and their citizens think again of 
the realities of our world, and how to break away from the systemic 
injustice and procedural unfairness that characterizes our 
engagement with the outside world.190  
 
 188. G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12, ¶ 6. 
 189. Accra Accord, supra note 2, para. 52. 
 190. Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanz., Speech by the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania to the African Union Commission (Aug. 31, 
2005), available at http://www.africa-union.org/VISITS/Tanzania%20Pdt%203
1aug05/SPEECH%20BY%20THE%20PRESIDENT%20OF%20THE%20UNIT
ED%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20TANZANIA.htm. 
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Unfortunately, while there is much talk in Africa about 
improving the continent’s economic indicators, there is less 
action in terms of creating the enabling environment needed for 
sustainable development and growth. The Tanzanian President 
notes that he “[has] not seen [Africa] seriously and sufficiently 
strategizing on this matter. Very little time in our agenda is 
devoted to such matters, which ultimately will determine 
Africa’s place in the globalization process”191 Clearly, Africa has 
to do a better job of effectively managing external relationships 
in a way that furthers the continent’s long-term and strategic 
interests such as the goals of diversification, value-addition, 
human security, and sustainable development. Finally, 
countries in Africa must individually and collectively determine 
how to manage openness in a post-crisis global environment 
given new questions now being raised about the wisdom and 
merits of trade liberalization and openness to foreign 
investment. 
1. Coordinated, Strategic Policy Response Based on Targeted 
Priorities  
A coordinated and reasoned response to Africa-South 
cooperation is necessary if Africa is to reap any benefit from 
South-South engagement. Even more important is a China 
strategy given China’s present dominance in the region. It is 
not clear that individual countries in Africa or the different 
regional economic communities in the continent have 
articulated their China/South strategy. The African Union (AU) 
is only now struggling to identify a role for the organization in 
the new Africa-South arrangements. It is important that 
countries in Africa identify their individual and collective 
strengths including the areas where the continent enjoys 
comparative advantage, identify the continent’s long-term 
strategic interests, and engage Southern partners from a 
position of unity. It must be accepted that international 
relations, including South-South relations, are based on power 
and interests despite the rhetoric of “win-win” and “mutually 
beneficial” outcomes that dominate present South-South 
dialogues.  
A coordinated and united voice in Africa’s engagement with 
Southern partners will go a long way in making up for the 
continent’s structural weaknesses, including political 
 
 191. Id. 
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fragmentation, poverty, donor-dependence, weak institutions, 
and weak markets. In this respect, regional integration in 
Africa is increasingly an important and indispensable tool that 
Africa needs in order to effectively manage external relations 
from a position of strength. Compared to other regions, Africa 
has the lowest level of intra-regional trade and investment 
standing at only 10% according to the World Bank. Regional 
integration will address the problem of weak national and 
regional markets, reduce the continent’s dependence on non-
African markets for economic growth, and generally improve 
global competitiveness. Although African leaders identify 
regional integration as imperative, they presently lack the 
political will to take the steps needed to move the agenda 
forward. 
African leaders must also get Southern partners to include 
and involve pan-African organizations and regional economic 
communities such as the Economic Community of West African 
States in future dialogues. Such a coordinated and unified 
response will make for more focused and organized engagement 
with potential partners and will ensure that some countries are 
not marginalized in emerging arrangements and that broad 
continental goals and visions are not easily forgotten. In the 
China-Africa context, some changes are underway. China is 
currently sponsoring the construction of the AU conference 
center scheduled to be completed in 2012. Since 2008, China 
and the AU have held an annual dialogue; from October 31 to 
November 3, 2010, the Chairperson of the Africa Union 
Commission (AUC), Dr. Jean Ping, visited China at the 
invitation of the Chinese governments. Whether these 
initiatives reflect a trend towards greater involvement of Pan-
African and African regional economic communities in Africa-
South dialogue is hard to say at this point.192 
2. Actively Explore Opportunities in Other Less Advanced 
Developing Countries  
Africa must explore opportunities for trade and investment 
 
 192. During his visit, Dr. Ping “reiterated the commitment and availability 
of the African Union to work with the Chinese Government to ensure the 
coordination and development of our common ideals,” but did not appear to 
push China on emerging concerns surrounding Sino-Africa relations. See Press 
Release, AfriBiz: Making Business Happen in Africa, AU Chairman Ping 
Concludes Visit to China (Nov. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.afribiz.info/content/au-chairman-ping-concludes-visit-to-china-
press-release. 
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beyond the BRIC economies. Africa appears to export more 
value-added products to places other than the BRIC countries. 
The 2009 report by UNCTAD found that the share of low, 
medium, and high technology manufactures in Africa’s export 
to developing countries such as Republic of Korea and Saudi 
Arabia was higher than 10% in 2008. Conversely, the 
continent’s export to the advanced developing countries of 
similar manufactures during the same period was no more than 
4%. Africa’s share in the trade of many developing countries is 
still minimal and could be significantly improved. Africa’s trade 
represents only 10.6% of China’s total trade, 3.5% of India’s, 
2.6% of Brazil’s, and a mere 1.2% of Russia’s external trade. 
Africa has to move beyond resolutions and declarations at high-
level meetings towards identifying specific ways to exploit the 
opportunities in South-South trade. Both the direction and the 
content of Africa’s trade must change. Consequently, Africa 
must pressure Southern partners to address barriers to African 
manufactures in their markets. Conversely, countries in Africa 
must also address internal constraints to industrialization. As 
the President of Tanzania rightly noted, “Without value 
addition [Africa is] doomed.”193 Regarding Africa-Asia trade, 
the Tanzanian President suggests that the relationship must 
“move increasingly beyond trade, to include trade-related 
investments.”194 Three types of investment are especially 
needed: investments directed at producing in Africa consumer 
goods for Asian markets, investments directed at producing in 
Africa consumer goods for Western markets, and investments 
targeted at producing locally produced goods for African 
domestic markets. Although countries in Africa routinely make 
demands of developed countries, they appear more hesitant to 
make demands on other developing countries, including 
advanced developing countries.195  
Exploring opportunities in developing countries’ markets 
also means developing the capacity to identify tariff and non-
tariff barriers to Africa’s exports in these markets and 
providing support to African enterprises attempting to 
 
 193. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Speech to the AU 
Comm’n, Addis Ababa, Eth. (Aug. 31, 2005). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Africa Union, Exec. Council, Decision on Trade Facilitation, 
Ex.CL/Dec.204 (VII) (2005) (requesting developed countries to “introduce 
measures that will encourage trans-national corporations to increase 
investment in Africa to ensure that the market access opportunities granted to 
the continent result in attracting a steady flow of FDI.”). 
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penetrate these new markets. Most countries in the continent 
lack the capacity to promptly identify damaging trade barriers 
in major export markets and frequently rely on reports from 
NGOs or reports to the WTO for relevant information. With 
respect to China, foreign exporters generally complain about 
inconsistent application of custom classifications, tariff rates, 
and import controls by local Chinese officials.196  
3. Conditions for Growth  
Many accepted conditions for solid and sustained economic 
growth are lacking in Africa. These include sound 
macroeconomic policies, stable macroeconomic background, 
strong and stable political institutions, peace and security, 
openness, and high levels of education. Available data suggests 
that most countries in Africa fall short on many levels.  
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Although African leaders routinely express concerns about 
the continent’s poor performance in attracting FDI,197 the 
political will to take the necessary steps needed to create an 
enabling competitive environment is absent. In a 2005 
 
 196. Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers, AUSTL. GOV’T (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/Tariffs-and-non-tariff-barriers/default.aspx. 
 197. Decision on Trade Facilitation, supra note 195, para. 2. 
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Decision, the Executive Council of the African Union requested 
Member States and the AU Commission to “review the 
investment promotion strategies pursued by African countries 
in order to eliminate existing constraints to FDI inflows,” and 
called on international organizations to “support African 
countries to review their investment policies and identify more 
focused and targeted investment promotion activities.”198 
Considering that most of the constraints to FDI inflow to Africa 
are well known and documented in numerous reports, new 
studies are not necessary. What is needed is principled and 
committed action on a number of fronts. 
4. Private Sector Development/SMEs.  
Most countries in Africa have yet to recognize the critical 
role of the private sector in development and poverty 
development and most are yet to adopt appropriate private 
sector development strategy. To maximize the opportunities in 
South-South trade, Africa needs a vibrant private sector that 
boasts strong small and medium sized enterprises that compete 
globally.199 To date, most countries in the region lack coherent 
and concrete policy directed at strengthening enterprise 
competitiveness. UNCTAD Commission on Enterprise, 
Business Facilitation and Development defines 
Competitiveness as “a nation’s ability to produce goods and 
services that meet the test of international markets while 
simultaneously maintaining and expanding real incomes of its 
people over the long term.”200 In addition to the basic 
prerequisites necessary for private sector development (e.g., 
investment in physical infrastructure and human development, 
and a sound legal and regulatory system), there are concrete 
steps that each country can take to strengthen enterprise 
competitiveness. Specific policies are needed to address the 
market failures that prevent SMEs from building 
competitiveness. Problems such as a lack of stability and 
 
 198. Id. para. 4. 
 199. See generally World Bank Group: International Finance Corporation, 
Where Innovation Meets Impact: IFC Annual Report 2010 (2010) (according to 
the International Finance Corporation, the private sector provides more than 
90% of jobs, drives innovation, and is also the main source of tax revenue in 
most countries). 
 200. Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Policy Options for Strengthening SME 
competitiveness, U.N. Docs. TD/399, TD/B/COM.3/58, TD/B/COM.3/58/Corr. 1 
(Apr. 29, 2004). 
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transparency in the legal and regulatory environments, 
difficulty accessing information about developing country 
markets, the absence of an effective, broad-based, formal, 
structured, inclusive, and participatory public-private sector 
dialogue, heavy, complex, and costly regulatory burden, and 
poor access to finance, information, markets, and technology 
must be addressed. Finally, governments need to be proactive 
in terms of providing business development services for 
SMEs201 and must consider appropriate financial and fiscal 
incentives to support SMEs, particularly enterprises in 
distressed priority sectors and in the rural areas.202 
5. Priority Areas and Industrial Clusters  
Governments should also consider identifying and 
supporting sectors that have high growth potential and 
strengthening selected clusters. In order to increase Tanzania’s 
share in the world trade, the Confederation of Tanzanian 
Industries have identified six priority sectors which can receive 
preferential treatment from the Tanzanian government and 
donor community: agro-processing, horticulture, leather and 
leather products, furniture, tourism, and mining. These are 
sectors that could benefit from appropriate cluster development 
programs. Support in the form of research centers, export 
promotion boards, and quality certification institutions could 
yield huge dividends in the future. The African Export-Import 
Bank (Afrexim) could play a greater role in this regard.203 
6. Redirected Civil Society Groups: Greater South-South 
Interaction and Coordination 
Thus far, civil society groups in Africa appear not to be 
engaged in the unfolding relations. Preoccupied with basic 
human rights, survival, and governance issues, civil society 
 
 201. See generally id. (noting that business support services such as 
training, consulting, technical and managerial assistance, marketing, physical 
infrastructure and policy advocacy can go a long way in helping businesses 
compete). 
 202. There are many options as regards fiscal and financial incentives. 
Financial incentives such as grants, subsidized credits and insurance at 
preferential rate have worked in many emerging economies. Fiscal incentives 
such as reduction or exemption from taxes on profits, imports, and exports 
have also proved effective in some countries. 
 203. See About Us, AFRICAN EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, 
http://afreximbank.com/afrexim/en/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) 
(discussing general objectives and goals of the Afrexim bank). 
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groups in Africa are marginally interested in global economic 
issues and probably lack the time and resources needed to 
effectively address the trade and investment issues affecting 
the continent. Furthermore, there is presently little South-
South interaction between civil society groups in Asia, Africa, 
and South America. Civil society groups in Africa are more 
connected to similar organizations in Europe and North 
America than they are with organizations in other developing 
countries. This is a problem that needs to be addressed.  
In conclusion, Africa must proactively engage Southern 
partners and seek to maximize the opportunities that South-
South trade and investment presents bearing in mind potential 
dangers and risks in such arrangements. In addition to the 
issues discussed above, a host of other issues will need to be 
addressed on a national, regional, and continental basis. Other 
issues to be addressed include: (i) improving the continent’s 
SPS infrastructure by prioritizing SPS investments; (ii) 
developing the capacities needed to negotiate new trade and 
investment agreements or renegotiate old ones and the capacity 
to implement and take advantage of these agreements once 
they are concluded; (iii) developing coherent and sophisticated 
energy policies taking into account the long-term sustainable 
development goals of the different countries in the region. 
B. ROLE OF AFRICA’S SOUTHERN PARTNERS 
Although South-South trade is on the rise, cooperation at 
the interregional level is recognized to be “the weaker link in 
South-South trade.”204 Legitimacy and integrity of the South-
South framework will depend on how widely and across regions 
the success stories emerging from countries in Asia and Latin 
America are replicated. The fact that South-South trade is 
subject to higher barriers and higher distance and 
communication-related costs is a major problem that must be 
addressed. The state-centric focus of Africa-South dialogues 
raises numerous concerns. Southern partners must involve the 
private sector and relevant stakeholders in unfolding dialogues; 
they must also encourage the development of decentralized 
Africa-South cooperation, that is, cooperation that takes place 
outside the purview of central governments and involves local 
governments, private sectors, and NGOs.  
There is need for collective effort in addressing old and new 
 
 204. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 16 . 
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barriers to South-South trade. These barriers include: (a) poor 
or non-existent transport and communication facilities;205 (b) 
high transport and communication costs;206 (c) bias against 
trade among developing countries in financial networks and 
currency clearing arrangements;207 (d) the lack of marketing 
channels such as specialized importers and wholesalers, in 
many developing countries;208 and (e) high levels of protection 
in South-South trade.209 Regarding market access barriers, 
issues such as high average tariffs, tariff peaks, tariff 
escalations, non-tariff barriers, and service trade barriers must 
be addressed within the context of the GSTP negotiations and 
in bilateral negotiations. Additionally, Southern Governments 
must: 
 Pay attention to the need to incorporate appropriate and 
effective monitoring, evaluation, and follow-up 
mechanisms;  
 Address process-related issues in the GSTP negotiations 
and in broader South-South institutional and 
regulatory frameworks to ensure that they are 
transparent and inclusive;  
 Ensure necessary interface between South-South 
arrangements, intra-regional integration agenda, and 
the multilateral trading system;  
 Ensure coherence between aid and trade by ensuring 
that market access barriers to African products are 
eliminated and do not neutralize the effectiveness of 
the aid and assistance they deliver to Africa. 
 Address biases against African goods in their respective 
markets including tariff peaks and escalations and 
 
 205. See Thomas Straubhaar, South-South Trade: Some Recent Trends, 
INTERECONOMICS, Sept.–Oct. 1986, at 244 (“Often transport and 
communication facilities are worse between different LDCs than between an 
LDC and a DC.”). 
 206. See id. at 244 (remarking on the oligopolistic trade policies of 
internationally operating transport companies in favor of South-North trade 
flows). 
 207. See id. (commenting on the bias against trade among LDCs in 
financial networks and currency clearing arrangements). 
 208. See id. (noting that the missing marketing channels bias distribution 
cost against South-South trade because these institutions are much better 
developed in the case of North-South trade). 
 209. See id. The protectionism is understandable given similarity in the 
production patterns of developing countries and consequently similar export 
goods. This problem may abate as new complementarities are identified and 
exploited. 
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hidden non-tariff barriers. 
As South-South economic cooperation deepens, many 
questions and issues will need to be resolved such as: 
 What are the core objectives of the South-South agenda 
and how do these differ from the objectives of the 
multilateral trading system? 
 What will be the role of law and institutions in the 
South-South framework? 
 Will SDT be a fundamental principle of South-South 
trade? Should it be? 
 Will the South-South framework address issues such as 
capacity building, aid for trade, implementation, and 
sustainability? 
 Will the South-South framework allow any regime of 
assessment? What evaluative framework will be 
needed or allowed? 
C. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
There is a need to mobilize additional resources to enhance 
South-South cooperation. In this respect, multilateral 
institutions and donor agencies must to find ways to effectively 
mainstream the use of South-South cooperation in the design, 
formulation, and implementation of their regular programs.210 
Developed countries have a role to play as well.211 Given the 
primacy of the North in international economic relations, 
South-South trade cannot and must not be seen as a substitute 
for North-South trade. At the very least, developed countries 
still have a responsibility to address the barriers to African 
products in their own markets; barriers such as subsidies, tariff 
peaks, and tariff escalations in developed markets have been 
found to be dangerous and very destructive of economies and 
peoples in Africa.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Affirming the idea of a new geography of trade and 
investment, the changing landscape of international economic 
relations and the growing significance of South-South trade, in 
October 2010, the G-20 reached a historical agreement to 
 
 210. See G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12, ¶ 9 (suggesting that multilateral 
institutions consider increasing allocations of human, technical, and financial 
resources for supporting South-South cooperation initiatives). 
 211. See New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 14. 
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radically reform the IMF’s quota and governance. 
Acknowledging the increasing role of emerging developing 
countries (EMDCs) in global governance, the G-20 proposal 
calls for shifts in quota shares to dynamic EMDCs, a 
comprehensive review of the voting formula by January 2013 to 
better reflect the economic weights, and greater representation 
for EMDCs on the IMF’s Executive Board.212 South-South trade 
offers viable opportunities for countries in Africa to eradicate 
poverty and achieve rapid and sustainable economic growth 
and development.213 Indeed, South-South cooperation “can have 
a positive impact on global, regional and national policies and 
actions in the economic, social and development fields in the 
developing countries.”214 Increasingly, Southern partners, 
particularly China, present themselves and are increasingly 
viewed as viable alternatives to Western primacy in Africa.  
Although South-South trade and investment is on the 
upward trend, the success is not widely replicated and Africa is 
not yet part of that success story. And, although studies 
suggest that South-South trade provides opportunity for 
developing countries, particularly LDCs, to diversity their 
export and export high skill content manufactures, the benefits 
of South-South trade are not automatic.215 Most of the growth 
and expansion has been limited to a few countries in Asia and 
Latin America. Only 27% of South-South trade in agriculture 
and 12% of South-South trade in manufacturing is conducted 
on an interregional basis. According to Ambassador Munir 
Akram of Pakistan, one-time chair of the Group of 77, despite 
accounts of success, “[a] great number of developing countries, 
in particular the least developed, the landlocked and the small 
island developing states, are still confronted with poverty.” 
Whether South-South trade can be the engine for sustained 
economic growth, diversification, poverty reduction, and 
employment in Africa still remains to be seen. African leaders 
must immediately address rowing asymmetries in Africa-South 
 
 212. Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-
20), Gyeongju, S. Kor., Oct. 23, 2010, Communiqué, ¶ 5.  
 213. See generally G.A. Res. 58/220, supra note 12 (noting the economic 
opportunities afforded by South-South trade cooperation). 
 214. Id. ¶ 4. 
 215. See Bailey Klinger, Is South-South Trade a Testing Ground for 
Structural Transformation? 17 (U.N. Conf. on Trad & Dev., Pol’y Issues in 
Int’l Trade & Commodities Study Series No. 40, 2009) (concluding that South-
South trade could be a testing ground for structural transformation in some 
countries but not in others).  
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relations. In this regard, the continued dominance of 
commodities in Africa’s export is a major concern because, 
“Africa’s heavy commodity-dependence has accounted largely 
for the continued marginalization of the continent in the global 
economy and trade and for its limited gains from the process of 
globalization.”216 Although Africa’s export to non-African 
developing countries has grown, these exports are not growth-
enhancing and do not offer the type of learning opportunities 
that can fuel structural transformation. Given the present 
composition of Africa’s export, South-South trade may not 
provide the needed opportunity for countries in Africa to 
diversify their export, access new markets, and export more 
value-added manufacture.  
This paper focused on trade and investment cooperation 
between Africa and other Southern partners. However, South-
South cooperation encompasses much more than trade and 
investment. Ultimately, South-South learning and cooperation 
“is about developing countries working together to find 
solutions to common development challenges.”217 Seen in this 
broader context, there is a lot that Africa can benefit from 
South-South arrangements. South-South cooperation provides 
opportunity for countries in the continent to diversify and 
expand their development options, build new partnerships in a 
broad range of issues, and gain greater voice in global 
governance. The paper identifies promising avenues for further 
investigation and empirical work: the main barriers to African 
export in key developing countries, the cost of barriers to 
African export in key developing country markets, the potential 
benefit to Africa of preference schemes by developing countries, 
the level of technology transfer occurring in the context of 
Africa-South cooperation, etc. 
In conclusion, whether the journey on the South-South 
train will be smooth, rapid, and beneficial for peoples and 
countries in Africa will depend on African countries, other 
Southern partners, and the international community at large. 
As the foreign policy toolkit of countries like China and India 
become more sophisticated, Africa’s response must also become 
more coordinated, sophisticated, and directed at addressing the 
 
 216. Elizabeth Tankeu, Comm’r for Trade & Indus., Statement at the 
Opening Session of the Seminar on African Commodities: Problems and 
Strategic Options (Nov. 16–18, 2005). 
 217. Ajay Tejasvi, South-South Capacity Development: The Way to Grow?, 
WORLD BANK INST., Feb. 2007, at 1. 
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continent’s long term development objectives. Although 
emerging trends are discouraging, there is ample opportunity 
for change. As policy makers in the South acknowledge, “[T]he 
responsibility for enhancing South-South trade and economic 
cooperation lies with developing countries themselves.”218 
 
 218. New Geography of International Trade, supra note 9, para. 13.  
